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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Treatise of Human Nature l stands as an important
da te in the history of epistemology.

For many, David Hume,

even more than Descartes, represents modern philosophy at the
cross roads.

Some believe that Hume symbolizes the suicide of

sens ationalism and that his work has lead to a crude and dubj
empiricism.

Others regard Hume as the intellectual

revoluti o . ~

and pioneer spirit who first had the courage to sever the ties
whi ch bound all previous philosophy to the philosoPh1a perennis.
For these, the work of Hume is not an epilogue appended to the
story of Locke and Berkeley, but a prologue to the drama of
modern philosophy.
One and all admit the immense influence of the
Scottish philosopher.

Despite many obituary notices and more

than a century marked by the dominance of German idealism,
empiricism of the Humean stamp is very much alive today.

"Not

merely Kant with his idealism and Reid with his realism but also
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1946. Hereafter the Treatise will be
referred to by the letter ~.
1

pragmatism and contemporary logical positivism--not an insignificant progeny--find in Hu..rne a progenitor.,,2
The Treatise is itself the classical statement of the
empiricist philosophy.

Cons~quently,

in the age of Absolute

Ideali sm, it was the duty of all self-respecting philosophers
to refute Hume.

Today, in an era of the dominance of a positiv-

ism conceived in the spirit of Hume, Hume is revered as a

Found~

ing Father, the precursor of positivism, and his works are
consulted as a wellspring of wisdom.
of this profound influence, Hume cannot be by-

~ecause

passed by the serious student of the history of philosophy.

The

challenge he represents must be met, and a carefully reasoned
assent or disapproval recorded.

Although a remarkable number of

books appears regularly on Hume, his importance is sufficient to
merit another study, especially since the author of this thesis
is not in full accord with the present trend of Humean interpretation.
T. H. Green3 and Leslie Stephen4 exemplify a strong

2 B. M. Laing, "Great Thinkers: David Hume,"
Philosophy, London, XII, October, 1937, 412.
3 T. H. Green, Introduction to Burne's Treatise gl
Human Nature, in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1898, I, 1-297.

4 Leslie Stephen, English Thought
Century, 2nd ed., 2 vo1s., London, 1881.
I,

In

~

Eighteenth

I

3

and traditional interpretation of Hume which asserts that Hurne's
phi lo s ophy is chiefly negative and that Hume merely reduces
the principles of Locke and Berkeley to their logical--and
absurd--conclusion.

For them, Hume has contributed nothing

po sitive to philosophy, but has merely inserted within it a
de bunking attitude.

The tradition has its origin in the writing

of Re id,5 Beattie, and Huxley.

Both Reid and Beattie were quick

t o read Hume's work as a final chapter in the story of Locke and
Berkeley.
Today, this traditional mode of interpretation is
much out of favor..

ve r ~

The modern who is at one with HUlDe on a

number of essentials does not like to hear his position described
as "absurdity."

Ralph V. Church contends that Hume's main con-

clusions on causality are independent of his chief psychological
dogma s.

Church insists that an 1nterpretation in the pattern

of Reid:
misses not only the actual conclusion of Hume's critical
analysis ot causation, but also his arguments to that conclusion from the impotence of apagogic reasoning in the
matter, as well as the analytic efficacy of the further
prinCiple that what is distinguishable is separable; in 6
effect, the substance of Hume's position in this regard.
From a somewhat different viewpoint, N. Kemp Smith

5 Thomas Reld, InquirY In12. the Human Mind, I, in
Preface and notes by Sir William Hamilton, .Edlnburgh,
184, 102-103.
wor~s,

6

203.

Hume's Theory of the Understanding, London, 1935,

alSO

att~sts

the inadequacy of the Reid-Beattie interpretation.

Smith's thesis is that Hume entered philosophy through the

gate~

way of morals and under the influence of Frances Hutcheson, and
that the central contention of Hume is that reason must be the
servant of the passions. 7 Other writers of today, who, though
they may not accept the writings of Church and Smith in detail,
fall within the general pattern, are:
Hobart, and H. H. Pr1ce. 8

MacNabb, Maund, Jessop,

This thesis will concentrate on Hume's doctrine of
causality.

The main purpose of the thesis is to present a

clear exposition of Hume's doctrine of causality, its place in
Hume's philosophy, and consequently the exact foundations or
premises on which Hume's conclusions concerning causality rest.
The chief problem will be to discover how many distinct lines
of argument are involved in Hume's apparent rejection of
causality and how deeply Rume's premises are rooted in his copy
theory of ideas, his atomism, his phenomenalism, and his view
of human reason.
As to procedure, the Treatise will be the main source
followed in the positive exposition of Rume's doctrine.

That

7 Norman Kemp Smith, Ia& PhilosoPhY of David Hume.
London, 1941.
8 The pertinent writings of . these authors are listed
in the bibliography.

5

Hume did not change his doctrine in any of its essentials after
the Treatise is assumed in this thesis, as it is commonly assumed
The assumption rests on the findings of Fr. Vinding
10 which frequently oversha.dows the Treatise
Kruse . 9 The Enquiry,
in clarity and conciseness of statement, will be employed largely
today.

as a reinforcement of the Treatise.
In general, the exposition will follow the order of the Treatise.

Chapter II will present Hume's critique of causali-

ty and causation.

Chapter III presents a dominant feature of

Hurne's theory, the doctrine on belief.

This theory of belief

is a necessary basis for the positive theory of causal inference
propounded in Book I of the Treatise.

The chapter is intended

to put in focus Bumels usually overstressed rejection of causality by relating this reJection to his positive proposal.

Chapter

IV is a criticism of the positive doctrine posed in Chapter III.
The chapter centers on three topics:

various objections to

Hume ' s analysis of cause, the aSSOCiation mechanism, and the
cri t ical acceptance of custom.

Chapter V attempts to determine

the foundations, the assumptions and

prem1s~s,

which ground

9 Fr. Vinding Kruse, Hume's PhilosophY in ~ frinci]al Work A Treatise ~ Human Nature ~ In His Essays. trans.
P. T. Federspiel, London, 1939.
10 David Hume, AIl EnquirY Concerning Human Un~erstand
in Essals. Horal. PolItical, Aaa Literary. ed. by. H.
Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1889, II, 3-135. Hereafter the
Enquiry will be referred to by the letter I.

~

6
Bume's rtegative arguments in Chapter II.

Finally, Chapter VI

assumes the form of an epilogue containing a positive theory of
causal ity to complement the criticism made of Hume in Chapter V.
Throughout this treatment, two questions recur:
underlie s t he denial of the knowa bili ty of causa.li ty?

What

And, even

granting tha t Hurne developed a positive theory of belief, was
the r eje ct ion of the knowability of real causality the necessary
prel iminary to this theory of belief?

CHAPTER II
HOME'S CRITIQUE OF CAUSALITY AND CAUSATION
Hurne's most extensive discussion of causality occurs
Book I of the Treatise.

The ostensive purpose of that work

to inves tigate human nature, especially in relation to moral
philo sophy.

Book I is a psychological and epistemological

inquiry into human understanding.

It stands as a necessary

framework preliminary to the treatment of the passions and of
Books II and III of the Treatise.
Bume begins his analysis of the understanding with
sucoessive inquiries into the origin of ideas, kinds of ideas,
asso ciation of ideas in the imagination, relations, and
abs tract i deas.

The whole · of Part II of Book I is devoted to

the ideas of space and time.

Having thus outlined the elements

of hi s philosophy, Hume proceeds to the crucial question of
the causal relation.
This analysis and explanation of causality is Hume's
mos t famous effort in the field of theoretical philosophy.

For

Bume, t he relation of cause and effect was the source arid basis
for all our statements of fact, all our knowledge of real things
not immediately present to the senses.
7

Hence, outside present

8

experience, a few intUitive propositions, and the proofs in
geometry, the whole scope of knowledge hinged on the causal
relati on.

Causality is extremely important in such a view and

its validity needed careful testing.
Humels entire investigation was intended to be a
search for t he elusive
connection arose.

impr~ssion

from which the idea of causal

But neither the qualities nor the relations

of ob jects contained the required impression.
the "direct survey" and turns to two questions:

Hume then leaves
why' we assent

to t he general causal max1m, and why we believe in particular
causal laws.
The response to these questions provides a division
of the contents of this chapter.

First, Hume asserts that the

causal maxim is neither ' self-evident nor can it be proved.
Secondly, the inference or transition involved in the mind's

,

proceeding from a given A to a related but absent Z is not
based on r ational demonstration.

The inference is based on

cus tom or the constant association of impressions and ideas in
the imagination.

Thirdly, the idea of necessary connection

between cause and effect results from an internal impression
or propensity to pass from an object to the idea of its usual
attendant .
This inbriet is the movement of Bume l s argumentation
and the scope of this chapter.

To shorten the synopsis would

9
be to spo i l the effect of this sustained philosophical argument.
The pre sent chapter will delineate Hume's sinuous argument in
some de tail , while following in large part the tortuous order
of the Treatise.

The beginning and end of the argument present

a fairly clear logical structure.

The middle ground is almost

unavoidably circumambient. ,
Hume begins his argument by indicating the peculiar
l
place causality holds as a species of reasoning.
Reasoning
can be di vided broadly into two classes:

reasoning ccncerning

the r elati ons of ideas and reasoning concerning factual relationships.

Reasonings concerning the relations of ideas give

intuitive certainty (and then are not properly reasoning
proce sses) , or demonstrative certainty.
Reasonings which concern the relations between objects
do not, suggests Hume, provide knowledge or certainty strictly
so-called .

The causal relation is the unique basis for all

rea soning about factual relationships.

By means of the' causal

rela tion alone can we attain existing objects not present to the
senses or memory.

2

The reason is that the other two factual

rela tionships, identity and contiguity in space and time, are

1 The sections in the Treatise correspondi~ to this
chap ter are: Book I, Part iii, Sections 1 through 6 (69-94)
and Section 14 (155-172).
2 ~ I, iii, 2

(74); 1, IV, i (24).

10

either teducible to cases of direct perception or are dependent
3
up on the relation of cause and effect. Observations concerning
identity and the relations of time and place are not reasonings
but instance s of direct perception.
concludes to some

cons~ancy

However, if the observation

or invariability in the relations

of time and place, it is because we have introduced the factor
of some secret cause as uniting or separating them.
is true of i dentity.

The same

Permanence or continuing identity ascribed

to an object results from our presumption of causes sustaining
the object during the intermim between perceptions. 4
Causality is, therefore, the principle of all inferences about matters of fact.

It is only the relation of

causality which informs us of existences and objects not present,
rThich can carry the mind from a present impression to one absent.
It is upon this relation then that Hume will concentrate all
his critical skill.
According to Hume, every -idea is an exact copy of
5
an impression. And Kume, following out the methodological

3 More properly, perhaps, causality is the foundation
of a relation of dependence. Causality itself can be referred
to the category of action. Hume's terminology, nonetheless,
will be re tained.

4 The alleged priority of causality to substantial
identi ty will be consicered in Chapter V.
/5 T, I, i, 1. (4, 5); E, II (14-17).
includes a discussion of the copy theory.

Chapter V

11
princiPl~

suggested by his theory of impressions and ideas,

proceeds to search f ·o r the impression from which the idea of
causati on arise s.

There is no one quality or impression common

to all objects called causes.

The idea of causation must be

then from some relation between objects.
The first and most obvious relation existing between
.
6
causes and effects is that of contiguity in time and place.
At this point -in the Treatise both contiguity and the temporal
priority of cause to effect are considered essential to causality.
Yet contiguity and succession do not exhaust the idea
of causation. Hume refuses to take a merely "uniformity view n7
of causation.

"There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into

consideration, and that relation is of much greater importance
than any of the other two above mentloned. ft8 It is this initial
refusal to reduce causality to uniformity which launches Hume
0n ,the intricate path along which his arguments will lead him.
For Hume fail s to discover any known qualities in the objects
upon which the relation of cause and effect could depend; he
fail s to discover any impression or impressions ot

6 ~ I, 111, 2 (75). Hereafter all references to the
Treatise are to Book I of the Treatise unless otherwise indicated.
7

Smith,

PhilosophY of D. Bume, 369.

8

T, iii, 2(77).

12

ne cessary connection.

He is unwilling to cast aside so lightly

his "fundamental" assumption that every idea is a copy of a
preceding impression.

At the least, this firmly established

principle must be given credence until the present case is
examined.
Neither the qualities of the objects nor the relations
'observed between "causes" and "effects" contained the required
impression.

Thus failing in his attempt to discover in sense

and by experience the source of the idea of necessary connection,
Hume determined upon a reversal of method:
i dea first instead of the impression.

to investigate the

This indirect method leads

him to a division of his topic into two questions:
we

~udge

first, why

that ,everything that begins to be must have a cause,

and why we conclude that such particular causes have such parti9
cular effects.
Hume distinguishes between the principle of
causality and the law of univocal causation.

These two laws

exhaust the intelligibllity of the necessary connection among
events.
Concerning the first question:

n'Tls a general maxim

in philosophy, that whatever begins 1Q exist, must have
Qf exlstence."lO

9
10

~

cause

This assumption, or maxim, is not a matter of

Ibid., (78)
Ibid., lii, 3 (78).

13
knowledge.

It is neither intuitively nor demonstratively

certain:
All certainty arise s from the comparison of ideas,
and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so long as the i deas continue the s a~e. These
relations are resemblance, proportiQns in quantity and
number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety; none of
which are imply'd in this propostion, \\1ha-~ver has a
beginning has also ~ cause of existence. I£at proposition therefore is not intuitively certain.
Thi s analysis is a direct corollary from Bume's view
of knowledge as based on the four philosophical r el ·a tions named
above.

Aside from instances of immediate de facto perception,

Hume accords knowledge or certainty only to propositions
r egarding universal ideal contents.

Only propositions expressing

the relations between ideas can remain unalterably fixed, for
t he relations "depend entirely on the ideas. n12 But propositions
concerning factual relationships are not so unalterably fixed.
I t was always conceivable for Hurne that an object might come
i nto or go out of existence without having been caused to do
s o.

A contingent fact can always be otherwise.

s ees smoke he is forced to admit he sees smoke.

When a man
But there is no

i mmediate external evidence forcing him to admit there is also
a fire there which he does not see.
Knowledge and

~ertitude

11

~.,

(79).

12

~.,

iii, 1 (69).

have been eliminated from the

14
area of

~xistents.

The assertion that the principle of causcli-

t y is self-evident or of intuitive certcinty involves the denial
of Hume's four relations as the sole sources of certcin knowledge.
The causal maxim is not self-evident.
cannot be proved.

Further it

The assumptions underlying the exclusion

of certitude from the world of existence is more clearly
evidenced in

H~~e's

proof that the principle of causality does

not admit of demonstration.

For the causal principle to be

demonstrably certain, the following propostion must be proved:
it is impossible that anything

can ever begin to exist without

a cause.

If this proposition were true, the ideas of cause and
effect would be necessarily connected.

If necessarily connected,

the ideas would not be separable.

But the fact is that the ideas

of cause and effect are distinct.

Consequently these ideas are

separable.

One can think of a thing as non-existent at one

moment and existent the next moment without introducing the idea
of a cause.

The contradictory of the law of causality is that

something can begin to be without a cause.
according to the above analysis, is

This proposition,

not self-contradictory.

causal maxim cannot be demonstrated since its opposite is
possible.

13

13

"Now that the latter proposition is utterly

II

15
~

Syllogistically, Hume's argument might be put in

this fashion:
All certitude arises from the relation of ideas.
But cause and effect is not a relation between
ideas but between existents.
Hence, there is not certitude arising from the
relation of cause and effect.
This syllogism, which assumes that matters of fact are indemonstrable, rests on the following:
The demonstrable implies the contradiction of the opposite.
But what we conceive as existent, we can conceive as
non-existent •
• : There is no being whose non-existence implies a
contradiction •
• : There is no being whose existence is demonstrable.
If the principle of causality is certain, it must be
self-evident or demonstrable.

If it is self-evident, it must

be at least negatively, though not properly, demonstrable by
reduction to the principle of contradiction, i.e.,- by pointing

incapable of a demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves
by considering, that as all distinct ideas are separable from
each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently
distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be
non-existent this momeht, and existent the next, without
conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive
principle. The separation, therefore, of tne idea of a cause
from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible tor
the i~gination; and consequently the actual separation of these
objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction
nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by
any reasoning from mere ideas; without which 'tis impossible
to demonstrate the necessity of a cause." T, lii, 3 (79-80).
The underlying argument is presented even more succinctly in the ~gu1rY: "The contrary of every matter of fact
is still possib~; because it can never imply a contradiction,
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so ccnformable to realit ."
IV i
·

16

out the tmpossibility of the opposite.

Hume grasps this

clearly and rests his case on two points:

the insufficiency

of demonstrative reasoning in the matter, and his principle .of
atomism, that what is distinguishable is separable.

On first

glance both of these principles appear independent of the copy
theory of ideas.

Whether they are actually so independent is

matter tor a later chapter.
Hurne adduces and disposes of three arguments for
causality brought forward by his predecessors. 14 The arguments
of Hobbes 15 and Clarke16 are refute'd as a preliminary step
toward exposing the petitio in the. argument of Locke.

Hobbes

argues that a cause is required to determine an obje'ct to
exist at some one time and at one place, rather than at any
other.

Clarke a.serts that it there were no causes, an object

would have to produce itself.

!he obvious objection to either

argument is that it assumes what is to be proved, namely, the

14

~

iii, ) (80-81).

15 Thomas Hobbes, %a!. Engl~Sh Works g: ThomaS Hobbes,
ed. Sir William Molesworth, London, 1 39, I, 115; III, 94;

IV, 276.

.

16 Samuel Cl~ke was a very influential thinker in
England in the early eighteenth .century. He was interested in
applications of physics in theological matters and regarded
lewton's cosmology as the grand vindication of natural
theology. Clarke, A Degqpstrat1gD 2l ~ Beipg !nS Attr1butes
~~, 5th ed., London, 1719, 125. This reference tor the
argument .Humecites 1s given by Jobn' Laird, Humels PhilQsophy
~ Human Nature, Jew York, 19)1, 97.

17

nece s sitv of a cause at all.

Locke

17

argues:

"Whatever- is

produced without any cause is produced by nothing:
words, ha s nothing as a cause.

But nothing can never be a cause,

no more than it can be something. n18
objection.

or in other

This falls -u nder the same

When we exclude all causes we really exclude them,

and do not suppose the object or anything else to be the cause
of its existence.

Humels objections here are well grounded.

Each of his adversaries attempts to prove something indemonstrable.

Locke's

argumen~if

it were more felicitously worded to

avoid dispute hinging on the word produced, might have escaped
the objection. 19
Hume's indirect method led to two questions.

The

first asked why we judge that everything that begins to be must
have a cause.

Hume concluded that this causal

self-evident, nor could it be proved.

ma~

was not -

Yet we hold this maxim

17 In arguing with Locke, perhaps Dume had a passage
, like the following in mind: wIn the next place, man knows, bY
an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce
any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a
man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all being,
cannot be equal to two rightangles, it is impossible he should
know any demonstration in Euclid •• ' . Vbat was not from eternity
had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be produced by
something else." John Locke, An Essay Concernipg ~ understanding, IV, x, 3, ed. Alexander C. Fraser, oxtor~94,
II, 307-308.
18 - ~ 1ii, 3 (81).

invalid.

19 Hume has shown that same alleged proofs are
Other explanations are still possible.

18

wi th con'fiction and make particular inferences with assurance,.
Our assurance or opinion, Hume tells us, must rest on "observation and experience. H20 The two sources of knowledge previously
discussed are intuition and deductive reasoning.

By observation

and experience, Hume must mean some sort of induction.
The second

questi~n

arises from experience.
into the form:

"Why

~

must necessarily have

then is how this causal principle

This general question is particularized
conclude, that !Y&h particular causes

~

particular ettects ,

~

J!bl. l!!.

~)

!a inference fr.om one !Q another?,,21

Every inference must begin with some impress1on,
some actual given, s1nce it cannot begin from nothing or go on
indefinitely.

In reasonings concerning cause and

mind always goes from the impress10n present to
absent but correlative object.
explain:

eff~ct,

th~

the

idea of the

There are then three ,things to

"First. The original impress1on.

Secondly, The

transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect.
The nature and quali ties of that idea. ,,22
Concerning the flrst element to be explained,
impressions ot sensation are perfectly inexplicable tor Buae;
whether they come tram the ' object, the mind, or God is an

20

L 1ii, :3 (82).

21

lW.

22

~.,

lil, 5 (84).

19
apparen~ly

insoluble Question.

Impressions of memory are

distinguished from fancies of the im&gination only by their
· · t y. 23
f orce an d VlvaCl

The following rema.rks concentrate on the second
member of the tripartite division, the transition or inference.
Stated in its simplest terms HlliTIefS problem concerning the
transition or inference is as follows:
Let us now see upon what our inference is founded,
when we conclude from the one (a causej that the other
(its effect] has existed or will exist. Suppose I see
a ball moving in a streight line towards another, I immediately conclude, that they will shock, and that the
second will be in motion. This is the inference from
cause to effect; and of this nature are all our reasonings
in the conduct of life: on this is founded all our
belief in history: and from hence is derived all philos.oPhy, excepting only geometry and arithmetic '. JIf we can
explain the inference from the shock of two balls, we
shall be able to ~c;count for this operation of the mind
in all instances. 4
The first observation is that the inference is not
based on a penetration into the essences which might reveal

23

Ibid., (84-86).

24 David Hume, An Abstract of ~ Treatise of .Human
Nature, 1740, reprinted with an Introduction by J. M. Keynes
and P. Sraffa, Cambridge, 1938, 13. This pamphlet, called the
Abstract, was hitherto unknown to Hume's biographers. Only
recently was a copy discovered by Keynes and Sraffa, who argue
convincingly that the little work is authentically Humefs
and not Adam Smith's as was formerly supposed.
The passage cited is an evidence of the assumption
that the rationality belonging to the principle of causality
should be transferable to the individual instances of causation.
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the necessary dependence of one thing on another.

Thus there

is no implication holding between impression and idea:
There is no object, which implies the existence of any
other if we consider these objects in themselves, and
never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such
an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply
the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving
any thing different. But as all distinct ideas are .
separable'25'tis evident there can be no impossibility of
that kind.
.
Here is again expressed the principle that what is distinguishable is se parable.

Hobart considers it the major conclusion of

Hume. He writes that Hume's "whole discovery" about cause and
effect comes to thiS, that "a proposition may imply another
proposition, but a thing cannot imply another thing."26
Thus the idea associated with the impression might be
displaced and another substituted for it.

There 1s no contra-

diction for Hume in the denying of any fact that it implie·s the
existence of any other fact.
This assertion, that reason is incapable of attaining
necessary connection between cause and effect, is elaborated
with special insistence in the Enquiry.

In fact, the clarity

and varied repetition of this prbposition is the

greate~t

contribution of the Enquiry to the present chapter.

25

~

iii, 6

(86~87).

26 R. E. Hobart, nSume W1 thout Sceptic1sm,. "H~nd,
ondon, XXXIX, July, 1930, 273.
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-A ccording to Hume in the

Enguirr, the relation of

cause and effect is in no wise discoverable A Rr1or1.

We could

never know that fire burned or that men talked or that gunpowder
exploded except from experience:
When we reason ~ prior1. and consider merely any object or
cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all
observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any
distinct object, such as its effect; much less, she~7us the
inseparable and inviolable connection between them.
The man brought suddenly into the world could only
discover succession because "the particular powers, by which all
natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses. n28
Before the event anything is conceivable.

Before the collision

of two billiard balls one might imagine both billiard balls to
stand still, or the ' second ball to remain in its pOSition, or
either to bounce off in a hundred possible directions. nAll the
suppositions are consistent and conceivable. n29 But certitude
requires the exclusion 'o r even the possibility of the opposite.
Here the oppOSite is conceivable -and hence poss1Dle. 30

27 10 IV, i (28); also, 24-25, 26, 27.
28 L V, i (36).
29 IU IV, i (26).
30 Th1s 1s not strictly reducible to the classic case:
nSocrates, while he is s1tting, sits w1th metapbYsical certitude.
In Hume's instance the disputed object is not an object ot
direct perception, but is inferred, ,argued to, and hence absent
from direct perception.
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€ince the causal inference is not discovered A priori
by reason, it must be experiential in nature.

Concretely

experience means this:
We remember to
of one species
individuals of
attended them,
contiguity and

have had frequent instances of the existence
of objects; and also remember, that the
another species of objects have always
and have existed in a regular 03~er of
succession with regard to them.

Experience means impressions taken collectively.

It is the

memory, continued to the present instance, of one class of
objects in constant ordered succession with another.

After

innumerable instances of the conjunction of the object flame
and the sensation heat. "without further ceremony" (without
bothering about real essences and powers) we call the one cause
and the other effect •
Experience' gives us the repetition of events.
of a single
~

& followed

followed by

z.

Instead

by Z, we have a number of instances of

Hume calls this contribution of experience

"constant conjunction."

This new feature offers promise but

it does not absolve us of all difficulties.

For if one instance

is insufficient to explain the necessary connection between
cause and effect, the mere repetition of similar instances will
not advance us along the way.

Causality is not reducible, as

noted earlier, merely to constant conjunction, and Hume was
quite averse to saying that we bad an impression of repetition.

31

lJ lli, 6 (87).
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£e here forecasts his conclusion that in the end it
may turn out that the necessary connection depends on the
inference, instead of the inference depending on the necessary
connection. 32
Reason does not penetrate the essences of things so
as to grasp a necessary nexus, between two things.
discover

~

Reason cannot

priori a necessary relation of cause and effect

between two objects.

But with the addition of experience, with

the help of repeated instances

of the conjunction of pairs of

objects, can reason thus aided by experience make the transition
or causal inference? For de facto, and Hume is always conscious
of this point, we do make the inference:
If reason determin'd us, it wou'd proceed. upon that principl
that instances, of which we have had no experience, must
resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that~-:t
the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.~j
This proposition cannot be demonstrated, sinoe a change
in the course of nature is conceivable and thus possible.

The

argument taking shape here can be stated formally:
Reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on the
relation of cause and effect.
But reasoning concerning that relation is based on experi'ence.
But conclusions from experience are NOT based on reason •
• : Reasoning concerning matters oi fact (eXistents, causes,
effects) are NO! based on reason. (Hence the inferences are not strictly reasonings or rational at all.)

32

~.,

(88).

33 Ibid., (89); also

~

IV, i1 (3O-33).
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~nen

we argue from a present cause to an absent effect

which customarily accompanies that
on experience.

c~use,

our inference is b&sed

But Hume is careful to point out that experience

of its very nature can inform us only of the past and present, not
of the future.

Experience is ·the memory of classes of objects

constantly conjoined in the past together with a present instance
of their conjunction, or of one member of the assccib.tion.
Experience cannot justify the inference since experience cannot
bridge the chasm separating the }.last and present from the future.

3~

Rather, an assumption 1s added to the data of experience.
past.

Ve presume that the future will be conformable to the
The inference is as valid and rational as this presumption

on which the inference is based.

Reason, again showing its

impotence in the existential and factual order, cannot indicate
why the presumption must be so, whY the- course of nature aust
continue in the future along the patterns it has exhibited in the
past.

Without reference to his COPT theory or his atomism, Kume

points out that the uniformity of nature is not demonstrable. 35

34 ~ 111, 6 (89).

35 on this point MacNabb remarks: "Bume does not deny
that the uniformity of nature is the 'presumption' on which all
probable reasoning is founded. His point is that it ls merelT a
presumption, which cannot be proved." D. G. C. MacNabb, ~
~: lU!. Theon 2!: Knowledge and Morality, London, 1951~

.

,

I

....

-
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The argument from experience does not give certainty.
Yet it might yield probability; it might tell us what is likely
to happen in the future.

Probability is usually the balancing

of a set of conflicting experiences, such as the casting of a die.
Given the six faces of the die and a definite number of throws,
we can proceed to calculate the frequency with which each face
turns up and consequently the probability in anyone instance.
With uniform experience there is no ground for
possibility.

calc~ation

of

The mathematical calculus of probabilities has no

I

material to work on other than uncontradicted and invariable
sequence.

The probal?ility that the sun will rise tomorrow

cannot be calculated from a series of opposed experiences.

The

I probability must rest on the presumption that the future will

r be conformable to the· past.
from probabllity.w 36

The presumption cannot Itself "arise

NO "logical reason" can be offered for the presumption.
Therefore inferences from particular causes to particular effects
our assurance and conT1ct1'Oll of the necessity of these particular
causal relations, can be justified neither as demonstrable nor
probable.
lor the sake of argument Kume now grants his opponents
that a certain cause had actually produced a certain effect in

36

L lil, 6 (90).
"

I

,'-

26
the past.

He returns to his original observation in this present

analysis of univocal causality, namely, that there is no penetration of essences whereby we might discover the necessary
connection of one object with another.

Thougb there might have

been one instance in which an object with these sensible qualities had the power and actually produced this effect, yet there
is no known necessary connection between these sensible external
qualities

and

the secret powers of the nature:

there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities
the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is
not led to for.m such a conclusion concerning their const~~
conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature.
and

Experience can account only for the precise period ot
time that falls under its cognizance.

All the effects of a

secret nature might change without any change in the sensible
qualities.

'The color, texture, and other sensible qualities of

bread have no connection with the secret powers of nourishment
38
and support.
This last argument bears out the logical connection
between the denial of the principle of causality and the denial
of an individual instance.

Consequently, the argument indicates

the interdependence of the tvo major questions which constituted

37 I," IV, ii (29-30).
I,

•

38

~.,

(34).
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Hurne's ind'irect method.

The denial of the causal maxim enta ils

the deni al of necessity in particular causal laws.

For to know

tha t a .-. articular thing i s a s ::ecific cause Hith a s pecific
effect, one must know that it is of a specific nature.

To know

this inner nature one must proceed from sensible phenomena to
underlying sUbstance.
But this is the very

This

m~ans

~ rinciple

This much is clear.

to go from effect to cause.

in question.
However repeated sequence might

enter in as a psychological conditioner or prerequisite in the
formation, clarification, and testing of the notion of causality,
repeated sequence or constant conjunction of particular

cases

of "causality" cannot establish the principle of causality in
the sense of every contingent being demanding a cause.

The

assent to a specific instance of univocal causality presupposes
the penetration of a nature.

The penetration of a nature

implicitly involves the rational demand of a sufficient reason
for the sensible phenomena.
Hume's second question was why we conclude that particular causes have particular effects.

The response to this

question involved a discussion of causal inference or transition,
the second element of causal reasoning.
three points especially.

The discuss10n comprised

First, the inference is not based on

any rational penetration of essences which might reveal the
ecessary dependence of one thing on another.

Nor is the relation

28

of cause and "effect in any 'Ha y

di

scoverCible

re a son even aided by exp erience cannot

mCi}~e

§..

pri ori.

Sec onc.ly,

the tr2. nsi tion, since

mere re petition of instances does not reveal a neces5ary connection.

Nor can the inference be justified a s probable since the

probability would rest on a presumption.

Thirdly, granting one

instance in which a certain cause actually produced a certain
effect, yet there is no known necessary connection between a set
of sensible qualities and the secret powers of the given cause.
To conclude, there 1s in all reasoning from experience
a step which is 'not supported by any argument.

nIf the mind be

not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced
by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that
principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature '
remains the same.,,39

There is no such thing as causal inference.

The imagination, not the understanding, habit and not reason,
custom and not evidence, is at work.

The nature of the transi-

tion is the work of associations of perceptions in the imagination.
The third element of causal reasoning, the nature and
qualities of the idea of the connected cause or effect, remains.
owever, instead

of finding our way through the intricate laby-

rinth of argument explaining belief, it is more consonant with

39

~,

V, i (36).
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the purposes of this study to proceed to Section 14 of the
Treatise, where Hume returns upon his footsteps to reconsider
the idea of necessary connection.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION,

The inference which 'rests on the idea of necessity
has been explained.

The

~pression,

is now the matter of investigation.

the origin of that idea,
The inference turned out

to be not "inference" but a transition determined by a natural
necessity.

From the logical justification of inference the

question moved to the psychological grounding for belief.
The present section will be
preceding

inves~igation.

somewh~t

repetitive of the

The precise objective is to determine

what we mean by power, cause, efficacy, efficiency, in shqrt:

II 2.Y.t

of n§cessitl. l!b!m we J.U. that two objects
~ necessarily connected. ft40
"~

~

Briefly, in the opening page of Section 14, Hums sums
up his whole position on the matter.

Since ideas are copies of

impressions, we must find the impression corresponding to the
idea of necessity.

But the objects considered necessarily

'related, causes and effects, present themselves only as contiguous,' succeSSive, and constantly conjoined.

Nonetheless,

frequent repetition somehow produces a new iapress10n by which

30
~

the mind is determined to go from a present object to its usual
attendant.

This impression of determination is the source of

the idea of necessity.41
Since this is an all-important stage in the main
argument, the ground will be carefully traced out which Hume
himself retraverses in arriving at this

ne~i

impression.

The

logical sequence of the argument can be briefly presented under
eight headings:
1.

One experience of an object gives no ground for conjecture

as to its effect.

If we perceived the power of the cause, we

could foresee the effect. 42
2.

Whence the notion of power then?

Reason alone cannot produce

an original idea (an idea not copied trom an impression).
Reason cannot conclude that a cause is necessary to every
beginning of existence.

Con$equently Locke's argument from

several productions in matter Is ot no avail.

The substantial

forms, and "accidents, and faculties," invoked by the "scholastics" to explain the operatlons of bodies, are all equally unintelligible.

Since extension excludes motion or efficacy, the

Cartesians conclude that God Is the cause of motions and operations in matter.

41

But we have no iapressionof Deity from which

~.,

(156).

42 This and the followlns numbered paragraphs are
based on Treatise, 111, 14 (157-169) unless otherwise noted.
L-______~----------~--~_~~~~~------~~~----~-~
, ----~~ L
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we could derive the
J.

notion of power.

The idea must be from experience.

Yet there is no instance

of a cause where we discover the power of the operating principle
"wherein the power is perceiv'd to exert itself. n43

If we have

an abstract or general idea of power, we ought to be able to

conceive some particular

powe~

in a particular body.

But to

conceive or comprehend the necessary bond between a cause . and
its effect would imply the absolute impossibility for one object
not to follm; upon the other.

4. Thus we have no true idea of necessity in objects. Even
after we experience both cause and effect, the nature of the
connection between them remains wholly mysterious.

Yet the

idea of necessity must. have some meaning.

5.

A multiplicity of resembling instances must give us the idea

since one instance is insufficient.

Yet constancy of conjunction

does not give grounds for rationally inferring that the conjunction is a causal one.

Repetition alone does not discover any-

thing new in the objects.

Repetition of impressions and ideas

adds nothing to them, produoes noth1ng in the objects, since

being repeated is not a qualifying pred1cate. The several
instances are entirely independent.
represent nothing in things.

43

Ibid., (160).

Power l necessity, efficiency

·6.

.
The resembling
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instances do produce a new impression in the

mind:
Necessity, then is the effect of this observation, and is
nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a d~ter
.mination to carry our thoughts from one object to ano~er.
Without considering it in this view, we can never arrive
at the most distant notion of it, or be able to attrl~te
it either to external,Qr internal objects, to spirlt or body
to causes or effects.44'
Necessary connection is the same as the transition arislng frOM
the accustomed union.
7.

The impression, not from sensation, must be internal.

the propensity, produced by custom, to pass fraa an object to the
idea of its usual attendant.

Efficacy, necessity, 1s someth1n&

in the mind. .
8.

Yet, this necessity is conjoined with things, slnce "the

mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external
and to conjoin with them any internal

im~ressions,

which they

occaSion, and which always make their appearance at the same
time that these objects discover themselves to the senses. n45
Just as we link secondary qualities ot sound, color,
to objects, so we suppose necesslty and power to lie
we conSider, not in the mind that considers them.

This pro-

penSity is not the same as anthropomorphic projection.

44

Ibid., (165).

45

Ibid., (167).
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~ere are several corollarles to this line of argument.

Necessary connectlon ls a datum of introspection, not of sensation.
it.

Hume ls not abollshing necessary connection, but analyzing
We find through retlective observatlon a causal connectlon

exhibited in the mind, a connection between perceptions.

This

connection is assented to in belief, but is as unintelligible
to us, as mfsterious, as the connection between external objects.
The causal connection ot impression and idea is the new determination in the mind to pass from one to the other.
There are two distinct factors in the idea
connection, "one as cgnditiop±pg it, and one as constituting it.
Constancy of conjunction is requisite as that through which alone
a custom or habit can be acQuired. w46 The feeling 47 generated
by this custom is that which const1tutes our impression.
Accord1ngly, there are two definit10ns of causa11ty
pOSSible, as a ph11osophical and a natural relation.

"'An

Cause is

object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all

the objects resembling the former are placid in like relations
of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the
latter.,n48 This is cause'and effect defined as a philosophical

46
feeling will be treated

in the
48

!J

iii,

s defined more succinctly

34
relation, and implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction.

As a natural relation:

"A CAUSE is an object prece-

dent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the
idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other
and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the
other. n49

This is an ostensive rather than a logical definition.

Bume reduces cause and effect to succession or uniformity only
as a philosophical relation.

As a natural relation it is a

determination of the mind, an associative connection and a
process of enlivening.

The word "determination" must not be

taken to mean real connection, in which event Hume would be
entangled in his own dilemma of defining by synonyms.

Hume is

giving a causal account of the origin of our idea, which account
itself is reducible to succession and constant conJunction.
one distinct element is the felt determination.

The

Feeling does not

give us knowledge of necessity.
Our causal sentence does three things:

it states that

A has been constantly conjoined with B; it states that when A
occurs again, B will occur again; it expresses the "comfortable
in the Enquiry as "an object, followed b.Y another, and where all
the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second." IU VII, 11 (63).
49 lJ 111, 14 (170). Necessity may be defined in two
correlative ways: "It consists either in the constant conJunction of like objects, or 1n the 1nference of the understanding
from one object to another." ~ VIII, 11 (79).
Or.

r

~

'r

"

1
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feeling of of-course-ness which we have when we pass, as we
habitually do, from the one of these beliefs to the other. n50
As the argument unfolded, the underlying and explicit
premises or assumptions of Hume have been noted.

At this point

it will be profitable to gather up the loose ends and state
explicitly these premises.
Regarding the principle of causality, the first
argument is based on Hume's conception of the scope of intuitive
certainty.

There can be only opinion with regard to matter of

fact or existence.

The second argument depends on . the principle

of his atomism, namely, that ideas are separate and that no fact
implies the existence of any other.

A third premise supporting

both arguments is the insufficiency of demonstrative reasoning
in the matter.
The
following:

rej~ction

of the law of causation is based on the

The mind attains only perceptions.

penetration of real essences.

There is no

The ideas of cause and effect

are separable; there is no implication holding between an impression and an idea.

The rationality of the principle should be

transferable to the individual instances.
The analysis of necessary connection reveals these
assumptions:

Ideas are copies of impressions; reason

alon~

50 H. H. Price, nThe Permanent Significance of Hume's
Philosophy," Philosophy, London, xy, January, 1940* 22.

can give

..
no
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new idea.

foresee the effect.

If we perceived the power, we could
Reason cannot demonstrate a necessary

connection, since it is always conceivable for one object not
to follow another.
The dialectic pursued throughout this lengthy chapter
leads to this:

b.Y

~

the causal maxim is not known by intuition, nor

priori demonstrative reasoning, nor by experiential induc~

.

tlve reasoning, nor is it found in the content of sense experience.
But does Bume deny the truth of the causal maxim?

In

a letter addressed to John Stewart, Hume clearly maintains:
I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as That any thing
might arise without a Cause: I only maintain'd, that our
Certainty and Falshood of that Proposition proceeded
neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another
Source. That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island
as Sicily; for these Propositions, I affirm, ' we have no
demonstrative nor intuitive Proof. Would you infer that I
deny their Truth or even their Certainty.51
From this it is frequently said that Bume did not deny causality,
' 52

but the rationality of the causal principle.

Bume assents to

the independent existence of bodies and to the independent
existence of causes.

The affirmative answer rests in each case

51 David Bume, The Letters ~ David Hume. ed. J. Y. T.
Greig, Oxford, 1932, I, 185. This letter was written in February
1754, fifteen years after the first publication of the Treatise.
52 T. E. Jessop, "Some Misunderstandings of Hume,"
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Bruxelles, VI, No. 20,
Fasciculus 2, 1952, 100.

on

nnatura~

belief."

Yet there are difficulities in the matter.
he never denied cause.

Hume says

Cause may refer to a real agent which

actually produces another thing so that there is a necessary
connection of dependence between the cause and the effect.

Cause

may simply mean an impression regularly associated with another
so that the recurrence of one gives rise to the idea of the
other.

If Hurne means "cause"

in this second sense, then he

cannot help but affirm the existence of causes.

Unknown causes

are self-contradictory notions if "cause" means impressions
regularly associated, since impressions are necessarily known.
The question is this:
sceptic?

is Hume merely an agnostic or a

If an agnostic, Hume does not deny the independent

reality of substances, causes, and selTes, but asserts we do not
know whether the intellect attains them.

If Hume is a sceptic,53

then unknown causes and permanent selves are self-contradictory
notions.
Restricting ourselves merely to causal connection,
if we take Hume to be an agnostic and not a sceptic, we must
take him to be maintaining the following propositions:
what we mean by cause and necessity.

We know

We do not mean ideas

53 By sceptic is meant explicitly one who doubts the
validity of the intellect. It is admitted throughout this discussion that Hurne has another avenue to reality other than
intellect or reason.
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regularly

~ssociated

with impressions or propensities of the mind

to pass from one to another.
external objects.

We do mean real connection between

But we find no warrant for asserting the

actual existence of instances of this real connection.
This sequence of statements renders Hume consistent.
However, since Hume tends

tow~rd

the modern theory that the

meaning of a proposition is its verification, he would probably
deny the second proposition above:

"We do not mean ideas • • • n

The probability of this denial can be corroborated by two
instances.
First,' Hume states that we have no clear idea of power
in any object:

nwhen we say we desire to know the ultimate

and operating principle, as something, which resides in the
external object, we either contradiot ourselves, or
a meaning. n54 This reveals an apparent insensitivity to consistency when paralleled with Section 6 of Part iii.

There Hume

seems to allow that things have real essences, though we do not
penetrate beyond the sensible appearances.

Here he insists that

the supposition is nonsensical.
Bume's doctrine on the external world furnishes the
second instance.

Hume first states that the external world

certainly exists and it is impossible to doubt its existence, and

54

~

iv, 7 (267).

next

.
through a
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philosophical investigation shows that this

selfsame assumption, which it is impossible to doubt, has no
basis 1-lhatever.

Experiments show that perceptions do not have

a distinct existence; but if this is the case, it is also a
contradiction to speak of their continued existence. 55
The problem resolves itself into this.

If substances,

causes, and selves are unintelligible, how can we believe in
them?

It is difficult to see how a man can assent to a proposi-

tion which has no meaning, which is unintelligible.
equivalently believing in nothing.

He is

A man can believe in that

which is beyond the power of the intellect to know, but can a
man believe in that which his intellect tells him is impossible?
On the other hand, the following position is consistent
and understandable.

Objective necessary connection is intelli-

gible and possible.

The intellect does not grasp this objective

necessary connection.

Nonetheless man feels compelled to

in objective necessary connection.

However the instances cited

above indicate that 'Hume was not always willing to admit that
objective necessary connection or permanent substances are
intelligible and possible.
There is no easy way out of this dilemma.

The

plainest solution, apparently, is the self-styled distinction

55 I, iv, 2 (208).
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of Hume as ! man and as a philosopher.

56

As a man, Hume believes

in the external world and in objective causal connection.

The

belief is the uork of the imagination and is the foundation
for ali reasonings about factual relationships.

It is not

likely that we are to take for granted what is without meaning.
There is meaning, s6 to speak, on the level of the imagination.
But these beliefs are not the basis for demonstrative
reasoning.

By philosophical reflection Hume can and does

question these beliefs.

Philosophical reflection will not root

out for good belief in the external world or objective necessity,
but it can enjoy a temporary speculative doubt.
Belief takes charge at the point where knowledge ends.
Belief is not an extension of knowledge, but a substitute for it.
Having denied the rationality of the causal maxim,
the problem for Hume is to show in virtue of what the causal
inference is felt to be ineluctable.

The ,following chapter

will delineate the all-important notion of belief, especially
in relation to causality.

It' will afford a positive complement

to the critical side of Bume set forth in this chapter.

56 I, iv, 7 (269)~

CHAPTER III
HOME'S CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY:

BELIEF III CAUSALITY

Causal inference does not consist in the rational
inspection of the relations of ob3ects, but is a psychologioally
determined process.
conditions.

It has no logical basis, but only constant

This is Humets basic argument.

There remains

little to do but to psychologize.
Of the thre~ ~lementsl constituting our causal arguments which Hume proposed to explain, only one remains.

It is

the nature and qualities of the idea of the connected cause or
effect.

The precise nature of the idea ushers us into a dominant

feature of Hume's theory, the doctrine on belief.
In his approach to belief, Bume is selr-consciously
"Here is a new question unthought of by philosophers.n 2

original.

This theory is a necessary baSis for the positive theory of
causal inference propounded in Book I. ' The importance Hume
attached to the doctrine can be seen 1n the fact that tne major
portion of the Appendix to Book III is devoted to correcting
possible misapprehensions ot this doctrine.
1 1J iii, 5 (84).
2

Abstract, 17

The material of the

~

Appendix *s succinctly repeated--sometimes almost to the word-in the Enquiry.

And as noted, the Abstract is insistent on the

notion of belief.
Hume is concerned solely with belief in facts.

Despite

the absence of rational justification, we human beings are under
psychological compulsion to believe in the existence of objects.
Further, we draw absent objects onto the level of the system ot
present perceptions.
Hume's task 1s to describe and explain this belief.
His approach is to distinguish between conceptual content and
belief-quality.

This distinction is a familiar dichotomy and

has its parallels and precedents throughout the history of
philosophy.

The earlier Scholastics d1stinguished between

concept and judgment and between essence and existence.

And

after Hume, Kant was to emphasize the world of difference between
a hundred existing thalers and the mere idea of the same.

But

the importance of the distinction was somewhat minimized by
decadent Scholastics and Rationalists.

The Cartesian notion of

the idea was so all pervasive as to obscure the value ot the
judgment.

Consequently, the renewed emphasis of this distinction ·

is a real contribution of Hume, rivaling in value his insistence
on the experiential nature of the causal inference.
Every causal inference terminates in
concerning the existence of objects.

canclusio~

But existence makes no

,
"

.
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addition to the ideal content of an obJect. 3

The difference

between the conception and belief in an object must lie in
the mfPAer of conceiving it.
The difference between believing

or not believing

an intuitively or demonstrably certain proposition consists in

this, that the imagination cannot conceive anything contrary to
the demonstration.

The person is determined to conceive the

proposition in one manner.

But in the absence of absolute

necessity in causal reasonings, "the imagination is free to
conceive both sides )of the .question.~4

Since both are possible,

why belief rather than incredulity?

We can conceive the proposition, whether we believe
or disbelieve it.
of conceiving.

The difference again must lie in the manner

A belief is then defined,

RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH

A PRESENT

"A LIVELY IDEA

IMPRESSION.n5

The

opening pages of the Treatise prepared the way for this definition
by the famous distinction between impressions and ideas.

These

differ from one another only in point of their different degrees
of force and vivacity. , To believe in an object as existent is to
accord it the same value as sense impressions.

3

L ii, 6 (66-67).

4 I,
5

iii, 7 (95).

Ibid., (96).

An

idea achieving

..

the status of belief must, then, have acquired a like force and
vivacity.
The characteristic of a conc,eption which has attained
the belief status is the liveliness of the idea, or better, a
lively idea.

A process of enlivening is the prelude to belief.

And the enlivening can come about only through relation with
sense impressions which are by definition forceful and lively.
The vivacity bestowed on the idea is explained by this
principle:

"that when any impression becomes present to us, it

not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it,
but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and
vivacity. "6
This communication or transfusion of feeling is happily
clarified in the comparison suggested by N. Kemp Smith.7

His

main assertion is that Hume entered philosophy by ' the gateway or
morals, and specifically that Books II and III of the Treatise.
the parts on morals, were written prior to the more famous Book Ii
further, that Hume came to the writing of Book I with his doctrine
on belief already in mind and with the conOern to la1 the
theoretical groundwork for his moral philosophy which follows.
It has been indicated that the doctrine of belief is foreshadowed

6

ill!1., (97).

7 "Inaugural Address," HJ.wI. JUlJ1 prfts'¥t DIY pr~blems,
a symposium, Proceedings 9t.. lll.I. ArIiWtiIIanoc ,tip LOn on,
Supplementary Volume XVIII, 1939, xxi-xxv. '
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in the openlng sentences of Part i, even though belief is allowed

to appear under its own name only in Part iii.

Smith suggests

that in formulating a theory of the passions and of sympathy
Hume was led in due course to attempt to work out an analogous
view of belief.
Sympathy is not a distinct type of sentiment.
is a state of feeling together with others.

Sympathy

It is a state in

which observing the signs of some emotion in others, we are led
through association to form the idea of that emotion.
present impression of the self enlivens the

~

The ever

of the emotion,

transfusing a force and liveliness proper to the self, and
thereby in effect transforming it into an actual emotion.
suppositions are two:

The

(1) the impression of the self tends to

transfuse its liveliness; and (2) Simple ideas are copies of
impressions so that by an increase in torce and liveliness they
operate on the mind in the same way as an impression.
Belief in causal inference is a ?arallel phenomenon.
What would otherwise be an idea acquires an influence on the mind
proper to an impression.

The impreSSion is some impression of

sense paralleling the impression of the self which operates in
sympathy.
Since every idea is related to an impression, since
belief super-adds nothing to the content of the idea, there are
three elements involved:

"a present impreSSion, a lively idea,
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and a relation or association in the fancy betwixt the impression
and the idea.,,8

Since the phenomenon of belief is internal,

whatever connection we may imagine between the present object
and the inferred object, these qualities are unknown and cannot
produce the belief.

The present impression, ' provided it was

observed in past instances, is the true cause of the idea and
·belief.

The belief arises without any new operation of the

reason.

Instead of a process of ratiocination, the belief pro-

ceeds from custom.

Custom here means whatever proceeds from a

past repetition without any intervening reasoning.

For this

process, a present impression is absolutely necessary.9
The conclusion follows neatly tpat "all probable
reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. fl10

In this

paragraph Hume is a little forceful, perhaps overplaying his
hand with the strength of logic.

For all reasoning is said

to be based on "taste," "sentiment," superior "feeling,"
CUstom appears to be truly King, in Hume's

"custom."

forceful phrase.

0'Wll

Whether it be an usurped sovereignty remains

for later discussion.
~

The doctrine here developed', which followed closely

8

T, iii,

8 (101); I, V, i (40).

9 I" iii, 8 (102-103). The meaning of custom is
treated more in detail on pages 50-53 of this chapter.

10

T, iii, 8 (103).
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Sections 7 to 10 of Book I, Part iii of the Treatise, may be
summarized under the following points:
Belief names the manner in which the mind apprehends an ob-

1.

ject as existent.

Belief in existence adds nothing to the

content.
The only significant difference between an impression and an

2.

idea is a difference in force and vivacity.

An idea, then, must

be "enlivened h to operate on the mind after
imT) ression. ll

the manner of an

~

3.

Belief in facts is a phenomenon parallel to sympathy.

All

impressions can transfuse their own vivacity into an associated
idea.

4. Belief involves just three conditions: a present impression,
a lively idea, and an association between them.

The constancy

of the association is proportionate to the belief.
Several fundamental questions are left unsettled by
this exposition.

Is belief merely vivacity of an idea or , a

distinct act of the mind?
and

Is the difference between impressions

ideas one of kind or merely one of degree?

What is the

nature of custom?
As to the first question, in the Treatise Rume commonly
held that belief in existence was a manner of conceiving.
,
,
11 I, lii, 10 (119).

The

48
belief-manne~

vivacity.

was usually described as force, liveliness, or

Hume said rather explicitly:

"we must not be con-

tented with saying, that the vividness of the idea produced the
belief:

We must maintain that they (vividness of idea and belief)

are individually the same. n12
To identify belief with a degree of vivacity involves
difficulties.

Hurne was singularly dissatisfied with his treatment

of belief and chafed under its inadequacies.

Several passages

from the, Appendix to Book III will indicate Hume's own corrected
view:
Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment.
There is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions
which are the objects of conviction and assurance than in
the loose and indolent reveries of the castle-builder.
When I would explain this mApper, I sca~efind any word
that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have
recourse to everyone's feeling, in order to g!ye him a
perfect notion of this operation of the mind. J
Here belief is a feeling or sentiment, an act or
attitude of the mind, a way of viewing an object as existent.
Belief is not merely a specific degree of vivacity 'o f our perceptions.

Belief is rather a class of complex states of affairs,

ith several distinguishing marks.

Such marks are a vivid idea,

steady conception, customary aSSOCiation, constancy and coherence.

12 Ibid., (116).
13

1,

Appendix to Book III, (624;
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A sufficient number of the marks must be present in a sufficient
degree. 14
The investigation of belief as merely a degree of
vivacity leads us to our second question.

In the opening sen-

tences of the Treatise, and many times there&fter, Hume speaks of
the difference between impressi.ons and ideas as one merely of
degree in force and liveliness.

However, the difference appears

also to be one in kind, for "it sometimes happens, that our
impressions are so faint and
fr om our ideas."15

lo ~ ,

that we cannot distinguish them

If vivacity alone constituted the difference

be tween them, impressions could not be so faint, nor ideas so
vivid, that the one would be mistaken for the

other~.

In his account of belief Hume introduces a significant
exception.
a belief.

A sufficiently lively idea may on occasion instigate
The idea "supplies the place of an impreSSion, and

is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose.1f1 6

14 This is put rather pOintedly by MacNabb, David
80; "It is a mark of belief that the idea believed is
~ividly imagined and holds our involuntary attention; it is
~ mark of bel ief that the idea beli eved is s teady and ha bitual;
it is a mark of belief that the steady conception of the idea
comes with the click of custom in suitable conditions; it is
~ mark of beli ef that we feel and act as would be appropriate '
~f the idea were true.
Hume describes these marks very well.
~t no one of them • • • is by itself a necessary or sufficient
criterion of genuine belief; rather a sufficient number of the
~arks must be present in a sufficient degree."
~ume,

15 T, i, 1 (2).
16 T, iii, 8 (106).
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In other words, we can know that a perception is an idea even
though we do not know it as representing or subsequent to an
impression, even though the perception, as apprehended, is
as vivid as an impression and gives rise to beliefs. 17
This ambiguity is partly explained by the emphasis on
"vivacity" as preparatory to the revolutionary doctrine of belief '
Hume wished to establish two things:

that ideas are copies of

impressions, and therefore a process of enlivening can raise
an idea, to the\belief status of an impression.

But if the

careful conclusions of the philosopher are to be distinguished
from the vivid fancies of the enthusiast, another factor must
be considered.
sions.

This is the "force and settled order" of impres-

The correct criterion of impressions is not merely

liveliness, but also coherence.

When the difference between

impressions and ideas is blurred, it is those perceptions which
have constancy and coherence that are called impressions.
Our third question concerns "Custom."

Hume employs

17 Especially clear on this point is J. A. Passmore,
Hum-e's Intentions, Cambridge, 1952, 96: "Thus, we can !mow that
a per'ception is an 'idea' even though
l~ We do not know it as representing an impression.
2 'We do not know it as subsequent to an impression.
\
3 It is quite as vivid as an impression.
4 It gives rise to beliefs in the same way as an
impression. Hume relies on the fact that, as he puts it, levery
one of himself will readily perceive the distinction betwixt
feeling and thinking'; he fails seriously to ask himself the
crucial question--c0uld we make this distinction if we were
acquainted with nothing but perceptions?"
.

l
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the

terms~custom,

habit, instinct, propensity, and principle,

rather indiscriminately.

At best the terms can be distinguished ·

in this way • . Instinct and propensity usually refer to some
innate power or

inclin~tion.

Cus tom and habit can refer to

developed or acquired inclinations, tendencies, and ways of
acting.

In the doctrine of

~elief,

custom and

h~bit

are not

used in the sense of the conventional mores of a people.
Custom and habit can be distinguished in this way.
Cus tom more properly refers, to the objective fact of the regular
r epetition of an action or event.
i n this sense in Hume.

Custom is certainly employed

Habit refers to a subjective disposition,

or developed power or capacity.

A person can rise habituallY

at an early hour without having the habit, the disposition, the
i nclination of rising early.

Hume employs the word habit not

merely to signifJ the objective fact of repetition or habitual
ways of actin-g, but also to ind·icate a disposition or inclination
s o to act. 18

18 Habit can also be considered in several senses.
A. Habit in the sense of biological and physical adaptation consists in the fact that a being retains a modification from a
certain action. If the action is repeated, the being i{ill tend
to be modified the same way in successive actions.
B. Habit can mean the spontaneous repetition of that which is
first caused by external causes~ This is exemplified in the
acquisition of la.nguage and customs.
C. Habit in the psycholog1cal sense can mean the conscious
acquiring by exercise of the power of doing that of which one
was formerly incapable. This implies the gradual disappearance
of consciousness together with an increase in automatit operation •
.

"
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C ~ tom

and habit, t hen, are the ultim&tes

Hume has run up against in seve ral points in his

~'hich

arg~~ent.

Re a s on ccnnot expl a in any of the basic facts of 0ur experience.
The altern&tive is not sceptici sm t:ut beli efs 1-fhi ch are n.sturc.l
and inevitabl e.
custom:

The princi pl e operating to produce beli efs is

'liTis not, therefore, reason, "Which i s '.. he gui de of life,

but custom.

That alone determines the mind, in all instances, to

suppo s e the future conformable to the past.

However easy this

s tep may seem, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to
make it.,,19
Custom is the non-rati cnal propensity to repeat the
same operation. 20

This definition does not explain all that

Hume wants it t o explain.

The principle of a s s oci2.tion of id.e a s

or the habi t to repeat an opera tion i s not enough to explain
something more than a memory belief.

To bridge the gap between

what 'Hould be a mere memory belief and what a ctually is expec-

In this sense we speak of a habit of self-control, t he habit of
reflection before thinking.
Of these three meanings of ha bit , Hume usually means
habit in sense B, while perhaps including s ense A. Habit in
sense C implies volition and thus is n ot appl i cable to belief
or causal inference.
The matter of this foot note was borrowed liberally
rom L&.l ande, Vocabulaire Technique et Cri tigue ~ .LA Philosophie
Paris, 1947, 378-384.
19

Abstract, 16.

20

~,V, i

(37).
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tation, Hume appeals to the presumption that' the future will be
conformable to the past.

This habit is referred to as a "species

of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to

oursel~es."~l He also speaks of a "kind of pre-established
harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our
i deas; and though , the powers apd forces, by which the former is
governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and concept ions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the
other works of nature.,,22

This "correspondence • • • so

necessary to the subsistence of our species" is effected by
custom. 23
Custom then names both the principle of association of
i deas in the sense of the tendency to repeat the associated ideas
and the instinctive presumption that the future will resemble
the past.

Under this estimc,te, reason in the sense of the

imagination:
is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in
our souls • • • ,This instinct, 'tis true, arises from
past observation 'and experience; but can anyone give
the ultimate reason, why past experience and observation
produces such an e5fect any more than why nature alone
shou'd produce it? 4

21

E, IX (88).

22

~,

V, ii (46).

23 ' .I,W.

24 lJ ili, 16

(179).
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In~brief,

Kuma believes it was the wisdom of Nature

. which provided us with a principle more secure and ready to
perform a fUnction so essential to the subsistence of human
I

beings than is the uncertain process of reasoning.

Inference

from cause to effect could not be trusted to the nfallacious
deductions of our reason. n25 Nature has taught us to use our
arms and legs without' providing ' usvith the scientist's knowledge
of nerves and muscles.

Put in biological terms" "the tendency

to ' expect repetitions of what has repeatedly occurred is
general and indispensable adaptation of living organisms to an
environment subject tolaws. n26
This again illustrates the parallel suggested by N.
Kemp Smith.

Just as the fundamental . judgments of morals rest

on feeling, and as in moral matters Nb.ture has provide,d us with
,

,

"immediate monitors," so, our judgments in matters of fact are
acts of belief, and belief like any other ' passion is predetermined
by the constitution of our nature.
This is another echo of the biological interpretation
of belief.

Care must be had here lest the evolutionary era's

emphasis on bio,l ogy be foisted on Hume.

Perhaps much of his

tloctrine on custom, habit, and principles of nature could be
!traced to the humanistic influence of classicbl ' Roma.n literature

25 E, V, ii (47).
26 MacNabb, "Hume
De Philoso hie Bruxelles V
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and philos"bphy.

However, there are indications thc.t Hume vaguely

foreshadowed the modern empiricist's emphasis on the biological
interpretation of human knowledge and behavior.
The great emphasis on association, the mechanical
connection between perceptions, clearly indicate Hume's debt to
Newton.

Hume explicitly prof~ssed the desire to be the Newton of
27
.
the mora 1 SClences.
But he also supplemented the mechanical

connection between perceptions with various instinctive propensities.

These various propensities are a witness to Hutcheson's 27

emphasis on the passions, or instinctive feelings.

Bume considers

reason to be nothing but a "wonderful and unintelligible in-

stinct."2~

This instinct "arises from past observation and

experience. ,,29
To say that past observation and experience begets
or develops an instinct is to come very close to saying that
the instinct results from the necessity of man . to adapt ·t o the
needs of his environment.

Also, Hume considers it more conforma-

ble to the wisdom of nature to se'cure such an important operation
as causal inference by "some instinct or mechanical tendency.n 30

4 (12-13).

27

T, i,

28

T, iii, 16 (179).

29

Ibid.

30

I,

V, 11

(47).
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All in all," "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the
passions.")l
Therefore, even if or when reason operates as something
more than an instinct, reason is always subject to that which is
instinctive.

The supreme functioning power in man is that which

is wholly instinctive, passion. or feeling.

Finally, in Bume's

system, belief assumes within its scope a great deal which was
previously accorded to knowledge.

And belief is apparently some-

thing common to the species since belief is predetermined
independently of the individualts experience.

"Nature has

de termined us to judge just as it has determined us to breathe
and to feel."32
The above facts lend support to the contention that
wi thin Hume can be found adumbrations of the modern pragmatic
and behavioristic stress on the biological interpretation of
human action and knowledge.

Ho\.'ever, the contention is prefaced

with the clear admission that Hmae did not explicitly accept and
assert the biological interpretation.
Belief and causality must now be related in the
structure of Bume's philosophy.
vealed bolO significant leads.
the believer.

The questions just posed reBelief is a certain atti tude of

Belief demands certain qualities in the believed:

31

T, II, iii, 3 (415).

32

Smith, Philosophy of David Hume,

46.
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belief-pungency or vividness, and systematic coherence of
perceptions.
Perhaps the best approach is to set forth the twin
beliefs which operate on differenct levels:
objects have

B-

the belief that

continuing, independent existence and the belief

that the thus constituted Qodies are causally operative on one
another.

These beliefs refer us to a large number of objects

which go to make up a system or world.

Since there is no

distinct idea of existence, existence or reality then must refer
to perceptions, their very givenness, and will be applicable to
anything else in so tar as they are assimilable to these
perceptions.
These existences form a "system. n
all that we believe to exist,

This system inclUdes

especially all unobserved tacts.

Thus the desk and the history book, the man next door and Julius
Caesar, New York and Shanghai, all form a part of the

syste~.

When the porter brings me a letter I suppose all the intermediate
existents between me and
the

my friend across the seas

~o

wrote me

letter.))
In the more technical language

of Hume, this durable,

inevitably believed, world or system will include impressions
of sense and reflection, impressions of memory, and their causal
~ssociates.

"Impressions always actuate the soUl and that in the

JJ L

iv, 2 (196).

,
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highest deg~ee.n34

The highest degree of conviction, or belief,

is native to sense perception.

The awareness proper to immediate

perceptions carries with it the assurance of an unchallengeable
and de facto type of certainty.

"Ideas of the memory" or

memories of sense-perceptions can be considered "equivalent to
[sense] impressions. n35

Any reality, then, has the bel ief status

which is a memory or sense impression or assimilable with such
i mpressions. 36
This basic conviction-attitude can be transferred to
other objects.

There are two requisites:

a vividness approach-

i ng the firm tang of sense impressions, a constancy and coherence
with the sy s tem of sense impressions.

To believe is to allocate

t o a place in this system. 37
, On the first level is belief in an external world.
This means belief in things that persist when we are not senSing
t hem.

The perSistence of things is not a datum of sense because

we are not always senSing them.

34

T, iii, 10 (118).

35

T, iii, 4 (82).

Nor is their independence a part

36 Hore str.1.ctly, there is inunediate awareness of
present impressions. There is belief only of objects not present
in sense data, but which have the same force and liveliness as
present sense data.
37

Passmore, Hume1s Intent1ons, 99-102.
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of the presented content.
pe rishing.

Perc ey tions

~r e

fl eeting, subj8ctive,

Various interrupted appearances give similar percep-

tions, which are
memories of

associ ~ ted

i ~~ipressions

by the law of resemblance.

The

are infected wi th the s ame belief-

quality as the original impressions.

When the successive memory

impressions are run together into one i dea, this idea receives
the memorial belief that was attached to the impressions.

The

imagination easily fills the gaps to form the idea of a
continuing · object.

The continuance of the object leads us to

regard it as independent. 38
The second system, or second level of belief, consists
exclusively of causal associ a tion.

We find by experience "that

belief arises only from causation, cmd that we can draw no
inference from one object to another, except they be connected
by this relation. n39

Ideas can gain the full belief status

only through causal association with the system of impressions.
It is only because belief has first -op erated in sense perception
that it still carries us to the actually existent when it
operates through causal inference.
Our picture is now slightly more detailed.

38

The reality

T, iv, 2 (181-218); H. H. Price, Hume's Theory
of The External World, Oxford, 1940, especially 11-37. Price
goes far beyond Hurne in the explanations proposed in the
latter part of this book.

39

T, iii, 8 (107).
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feeling suffuses all iml-'I'essions of sense and memory.

\Oie believe

\ihatever is necessarily connected with an existent &150 exi5ts.
Associ&tion gently and smoothly le&ds us to believe in an
external world of continuing independent bodies.

The only

absent objects which enter our system are the causal compani ons
of impressions.

The causal companions borrow their belief

quality or vigor from the impressions.

This is the

~orld

of

HUlne, a "real world" of inter-connected perc€i:- tions, und these
are the objects at which his twin beliefs arrive.

-

..
CHAPTER IV
CRITICISM OF HUME'S CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY
The criticism of this chapter will be centered on
three topics:

various

object~ons

to Hume's analysis of cause,

t he association mechanism, the critical acceptance of customs.
In place of the intellectual grasp of causality, Hume
has substituted a theory of belief.

But to account for the assent

given to ideas reached by way of causal inference, Hume must
no t merely explain why they are assented to, but also why they
al one are thus accepted by the mind.

Hume must explain:

nCa)

how we come to believe that some objects are causally connected
without believing that others are, (b) how we distinguish cause
fr om effect, or (c) how causal connection differs from the
connection of qualities in an object."l
The most obvious, trite, and nonetheless as yet
unanswered objection is this.

Causality is one of the three

natural relations of association.

Why then does causality alone

l ead to belief, while resemblance and contiguity merely suggest

I
Philosophi~al

Monroe C. Beardsley, "A Dilemma for Hurne,"
Review, New York, LII, January, 1943, 40.
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connections between objects?

Instances of

also instances of contiguity.

c~us81

relation are

If contiguity suffices to account

for the as s ociati,on of ideas in any instance, it suffices in the
causal instance.
Hume foresees the objection and treats it to some
extent.

2

He regards resemblance and contiguity as supporting

his theory of belief.

For if mere resemblance and contiguity

have some effect in enlivening ideas, how much more so an invariable relation should enliven ideas.

"The objects" which the

rela tion of cause and effect presents "are fixt arId unalterable."
The singular nature of cause and effect is due to the invariability or constant uniformity of the conjoined objects which are
causes and effects.
On the part of the objects, this is no more than
constant contiguity and succession.

Now i t is true that by

definition causality differs from contiguity, since in casual
conjunction, in addition to the objective constant conjunction,
there is the subjective felt necessity.

The precise point at

issue is why there is a felt necessity in the one case of constan
conjunction and not in another.

That there is a constant

conjunction, that there is a transition, that there is a felt

2.

I,

3

Ibid., (110).

iii, 9 (106-110).
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necessity"", Hume rightly asserts.

But once "power" is subtracted

from objects, there is no explanation of why the mind asserts
necessity.
, There are instances of constant conjunction in which
the mind neither feels nor projects a necessary connection
between the ' conjoined object~:

the succession of night and day,

the front and back of a house, the lighting of a cigarette anq
the drawing of smoke.

And on the other hand there are instances

of a felt determination or projection of necessary connection in
objects which are not constantly conjoined:

the striking and the

flaming of very unreliable matches; the taking of medicine and
the relief from pain.
Further, Hume's explanation of our belief in necessary
connection depends upon s?owtng that the imagination relates
impressions according to the modes of ,contiguity and succession
before it relates them causally, and as a condition for so
relating them.

Constant conjunction refers to 'all that is

afforded by experience as a ground for any causal belief.

Con-

tiguity and succession define conjunction, and are consequently
of some import.

Hume regards them at first as essential to

causation, but progressively neglects them.
Contiguity is both spatial and temporal.

Billiard

balls are obviously spatially contiguous, and Hume concentrates
on this example in the

Enq~rY.

But the taste and amell of a

64
piece of fl1lit are not
f ruit.

spatially contiguous with that piece of

The fruit is in space but the smell and taste are

"nowhere," according to the doctrine of secondary qualities.
The spatial inherence of the smell in the object is inferred
after their necessary connection is established. 4
and the attendant heat, the

te~sile

The flame

strength and the metal

(any property and its substance) cannot

properly be regarded as

s patially contiguous.
Temporal contiguity can mean either that the objects
exist for a time contemporaneously or that the cause-object
must appear just before the effect-object.

The first interpre-

t ation makes contiguity to mean mere togetherness in experience.
The second is reducible to succession, which is the temporal
priority of the cause to the effect.
Temporal priority is not a universal element.
I mpressions do not necessarily have to come just before ideaS.
Suppose a man alrrays saw smoke in his experience before he sa.w
f ire, or always heard the train whistle before he saw the train.
The first element in the experience is not necessarily the cause
of the subsequently experienced, nor is it thought to be so.

If

temporal priority is a necessary element of causation, there is
no explanation why the mind can go from effect to cause as well

4
i

T, iv, 5 (237).
1

;1
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as from cause to effect.
The difficulty becomes a dilemma when objects are
always experienced simultaneously:
'fater; the feeling of heat

stes.m and the bubbling of

and the appearance of flame on

entering a room.

There i~ the classic example of the heavy book
and the soft cush\ on. 5 When we let the book fall, the cushion
s inks under it.

The interval between cause and effect 1s

s carcely discrirninable.

wnich came first, the sinking of the

cushion or the pressing of the book?

Logical analYSiS, and not

phenomenal discrimination, indicates that it is not merely the
appearance but the activity of the objects which must be
considered.
Conjunction in the sense of cont1guity a.nd succession
i s apparently an unessential condition of causal belief.

The

undes1rable conclusion is that mere repeated appearance in
experience is a sufficient ground of causal belief.

There should

t hen be no more compulsion to feel necessity in the flame causing
t he heat, than that the wall causes the window, the chair causes

5

This is alluded to in Beardsley, "A Dilemma for
Hume," 37: "In considering this reply, we may select a classic
example in which the interval between cause and effect is perhaps not discriminable: we hold a heavy book level with the
upper surface of a soft cushion, just touching it, and then we
let the book fall as the cushion sinks beneath it. Does the
cushion sink after the book presses it, or at the same time?
This question arises whenever the cause appears to operate along
with the effect; the book presses, the cushion sinks: which is
earlier? And, ~hen, which is the cause and which effect?n
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the room, the heat causes the flame, the one half of the sli pp er
cc uses the other unobserved half.
The examples are not intenc1ed as
cleverness.

c:.

bit of undergradua te

Hume himself has said on more than one occasion:

"Anything ::na.y produce anything.,,6

This must mean th.st the

s pe cies of object X which regularly appears with or after any
other s pecies of object Y will come to be believed the effect
of Y.

Instances to the contrary have been asserted before.
The appeal to constant conjunction was intended to

explain why particUla'r causes have particular effects.

Tl::.ere

is the more general question ofW'hy every event has a cause,
which Hume decided "to sink" in the question \Thy particular
causes have particular effects.

i{hen I hear a b&ng, two ques-

tions arise, why I believe thc:..t the bang has some cause or other
and vhy I believe that the bang was caused by a slamming door.
The answer to the second question is that the belief arises from
the association of that type of noise \;ith the particular visual
datum of a slamming door.
for the first question?

But how does this e xplanation serve
How could cus tom associate the bang
"

with "something or other."
Humets answer is in the section on the probability of
causes. 7

Philosophers and scientists observe the complexity of

nature and realize that "chance" occurrences may proceed from

7

T, iil, 12.
-
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cGDc e(j le d. c ountsr Ci ctine CE.us es .

Further,

O LAr

generc, l succe s s

i n o.i s cove2' ine r egul a ri tie s , r el E. ti on s of

exE.

ct and unVc. r fing

depe ndence, is roughly pr ovortion2t e to the minutenes s Lnd extent
of t h e obs ervations that we cen

~ a ke.

Either the pro pensity

of eXf-:ect c: ncy is already pres ent, i s ir...na te in the constitution
of our na tu:o e, or :-:l2.ny se ts of ·conj oined
i nst ances,

gener ~ lize

The

our sens e of

su~position

0

bj e cts, many cE,us al

e x~ ec t ancy.

of a 8 eneral, innate propensity of

e xpectancy wou ld seem to be an ad hoc hypothesis.

Also this

hypothesis would some',rha t vi tia te Hume' s explanation of the
particular causal inference as a mental determination resulting
from the experience of constant conjunction.

The alternative

explanation, that many sets of conjoined objects generalize
our sense of expectancy, involves considerable difficulty.
For, granted that the princi ple of causality is not
innate and requires at least one experience of causation for the
formulation of the principle, yet it is difficult to see how the
re peated experience of associated events can generate the
principle.

The repeated association of objects gives us accumu-

lation of experience.

The accumulation, of itself, does not

compel us to make the necessary judgment:
caused the banging noise."

"Something must have

And how can a given event, a noise,

become as s ociated with a general "something or other"?

Hume's

explanation leads us to consider the role played by association.
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.,

For the "Newton of the meral sciences," associations
are "the cement of the universe."S

HO'rlever, the association

me chanism does not explain all the facts Hume would like it to
explain.

Burne never

disavo~s

his basic associationist scheme.

Yet wh e r e the mechanicc.l connection of perceptions begin,s\to
feil, Burne a plJ ea.ls to various '.lvropensities" of. the soul.
Each propensity is a concession and a deviation from his basic
empiricist and associationist pattern.
not be enumerated here.

These concessions will

The instartces of the natural beliefs

are sufficient.
Causal connection fits in neatly with the associationist pattern.

The causal relation is reducible to the repetition

of similar conjunctions.

Under the influence of association,

the mind passes from one percept i on to another.

But even here

there is the "irregular" propensity which accounts for the mind' s
projection of necessity into the perceptions themselves.
the transfer of vivacity is not wholly mechanical.

Also,

It depends

on the "propensity of the imagination . n9
The mechanical links between ideas cannot of themselves generate ideas. 10 In the case of independent and

8

Abstract, 32.

9

T, iv, 2 (208).

10

See Passmore, Hume's Intentions, 121:

"We unite our
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continuous existence, the fiction of continued existence is
ascribed to another propensity, the propensity of the mind for
creating fictions to overcome the sensible uneasiness due to
the interruptedness of our

~ ercepticns.

Further, does the principle of associction explain or
g e n ~ ra te

ideas?

~1ore

consis ten tly ".. i th Hllille' s philosophy the

principle stc. tes the conai tions under which we find the beliefs
to occur, though Hume's extended treatment would incline one to
believe that these mechanisms themselves explain the origin of
our beliefs in causal connection and independent existence.
In the instance of causality, the principle can
scarcely say more than that certain perceptions (impressions and
i deas or objects) are constantly conjoined and that there is an
attendant belief.
circle."

To say more would invite the cry of "vicioUS

The associative princi ple cannot state that elements

in association are the cause of belief, or that the vivacity of
the impression is the cause
object or idea.

o~

the belief in the corresponding

Summarily, the associative princi ple states the

circumstances or conditions of repea ted conjunction.

perceptions, he suggests, 'by the fict i on of a continued existence' in order to reconcile the facility with which we pass from
one perception to another with their actual interruptedness.
Thus yet another 'propensity' is invoked; the mind when confronted
by contradictions feels 'a sensible uneasiness'; it creates
fictions in order to overcome this uneasiness. 'The mechanical
links between our ideas could not of themselves generate fictions:
the co-operation of 'our mind' is vital, as we have already seen,
and as Hume here substanti~lly admits."
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ff the as so ci a tive me chanisms, or princi ple s , mean
mo r e t han a

~ t a te ment

of the conditions of repeated conjunction,

they are subj ect to the s&me cri ti que
"habit.!!

\~-h l t

eheaci l evels

8.

t

"It is difficult to understand I,Thy Hwne exempts 'h2blt'

from the s ame cr iticism as that a pplied to the notion 'caus e.'
We have no 'imp ression' of 'habit,' just
sion' of 'cau s e.'

8.S

we have no 'impre s -

Cause, re petition, habit are all in the same

boat."ll
A habit or associative mechani sm is something 'Hhich we
infer.

These principles are not immediately experienced; there

is no impression of habit or of an as so ciative mechan i sm.
Certainly an impression of a permanent habit or pr i nci ple would
be as difficult to account for as an impression of a permanent
SUbstance.
tained.

Impressions for Hume are individual and self-con-

Therefore, a habit can only be an aggregate of the

s ep arate and independent expectings or transitions which are
attached each to a particular pair of impressions in a Single
psychical history.

The same can be said of any principle or

"mind" which is invoked as an enduring element in the explanation
of psychical. conjunction.
.

11
1941, 213.

A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, New York,
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In final view, perh&ps it is be tter to consider the
na t ur ul beli ef s as ultim&te s .

Dee per f&cts or exp l anations

be pre sent in reality, but we i o not attain them.
does not exactly expl ain the beliefs.

~ay

Associ &tion

The natural beliefs a re

r ega rded a s f a cts; all expl anations of t hes e "fa cts" are on the
level of hypothesis. 12 The natural beli efs are the central
po sitions t o be defended at any cost.

The psychological

mechanisms through which Hume attempt s to explain the natural
beliefs, are the military outposts. l ]

Such terms as principle

of as s ociation, custom, habit, are an indirect homage to
metaphysical unity and an avowal of the impotence of pure
empiricism. 14

12

T, iv, 2 (206-207).

I] This is elaborated in Smith, The PhilosophY of
Davi d Hume, 225: "To employ a military metaphor: if the
'natural beliefs' be regarded as central ,pos i tions to be held
a t all costs,they can be defended either by themselves or by
means of supporting outposts. If Hume's psychological mechanisms--through which he seeks to explain t he natural beliefs in
Book I and the indirect passions in Book II--be taken as
repres enting such outposts, it is these forward positions that he
has chosen to do much of his philosophical fighting; and ' he has
certainly been almost as eagerly concerned to defend them for
their own sakes, as by their aid to secure the capital positions
in the rear."
14 Harechal states this in a short passage of unusual
Joseph Marechal, S. J., Le Point de Depart De La
Metaphysigue, Paris, 1942, II, 242: "Ou encore, entre les succession d'impressions et d'idees, ce sera L'habitude active
qUi, jettera, comme un trait d'union, Ie lien dyn~~ique de causal,
•
•
I
~
,
•
ite. Enfin les discont~nu~tes et les eclip@es d'une exper~ence
i~sight.

.
Belief
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has definitely sho\-In itself to be 1{hat Hume said

it was, "more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the
cogitative part of our natures. nlS
But the custom which
accounts for belief also accounts for excessive beliefs, for
propaganda and prejudice.
To curb excessive over-beliefs and, at the same time,
the unguarded tendency to seek for a sufficient cause, Hume
relies upon a moderate scepticism in philosophy.

In the conduct

of life one must choose between superstition and philosophy.
"And in this respect I make bold to recommend philosophy. ,,16
Besides the reason which is a wonderful instinct, Hume holds an
analytic reason supplying a criterion in the absence of which
his distinction between fact and fiction, between objective and
subjective, between the best thought-out sCientlfic belief and
the crudest superstition, could have no legitimate meaning.

The

natural beliefs are legitimate only within a strictly limited
If

·

trop courte se combleront ta;t bien que ma1 . ~~~ 11empietement
de,cette Icroyance l , qui cree dans la dlverslte ondoyante des
idees la stabl1ite d'une 'valeur en soil. Les termes s1 souvent
r~petes par Hume, de 'custom', 'habit', 'belief or assentl, sont
autant d'hommages indirects a l'unlte metaphyslque et d'aveux
d'lmpulssance de l'emplrls.me pur. En les pressant un peu, on en
verralt sourdre les notions metaphyslques de Is~eclfication' ou
de 'causa1l te forme1le', .de 'flna11 te', et d' I etre' ."

15 I, lV, 1 (183).
16

~,

lv, 7 (271).
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domain, "tfte experienced train of events."
insofar as it conforms to experience.

Custom is king only

And it is the invaria-

bility and consequent universality of experience, apparently,
that is the supreme norm.
The scientifically minded man frames his generalizati ons in accord with observed .constant conjunctions.

The

superstitious man generalizes according to whim and fancy.

This

i s Hume's way of meeting the fact that not all regularities are
r eliable, not all customs good customs.
The problem of legitimating this criterion is not easy.
Reasoning based on causal inference
t he senses.

goes beyong the evidence of

For Hume this does not mean that causation unveils

t he meaning of the sense data; but that reason outruns the
evidence.

This makes causal inference to rest on natural

compulsion.

Now if custom and belief operate naturally,

i nstinctively, how can reason correct or adjust the results?
Belief ~follows

inevitablY and in proportion to the number of

experiences of objects.

If belief or custom is erroneous in

some cases, why should we trust it in any?

And if it operates

.\

naturally, how are we free to correct its results in one instance,
. without being free to reject all its fallacious results?
The basis on which reason supplements custom is
apparently assumed .a s an ultimate.
a good practical instance.

The question of miracles is

Uniformity of experience is the

generator of bel'-ef'.

Therefore our belief, says Hume, should

be proportioned to the uniformity of experience.

But if belief

should arise without uniformity of experience, why should we
a ttempt to control it?

The very fact

th~t

belief arises without

uniformity of experience, shows that belief' can be had without
i t, and therefore there is no general rule governing the case.
I

Reason can give no evidence for insisting one accept only
uniformity.

In the framework of Hume's philosophy, I am deter-

mined to believe.

The only reason Hume could offer for making

uniformity the criterion was that uniformity is 'constantlY
conjoined with belief.

This is not the case.

The developed instrumentalism of John Dewey proffers
a more satisfying justification.

If we consider belief in its

bi ological, functional aspect, then those beliefs are to be
ac cepted which satisfy the problems and needs of our environment,
those beliefs are to be accepted which fit into the "world" of
realities composed of our two systems of beliefs.

Perhaps Hume

wa s tending toward this type of coherence theory.

It is, in

turn, open to the relativist charges leveled against all
matism and instrumentalism.
The inquiry conducted 1n th1schapter reveals
Humets constructive theory is shaky at several points.

The

chapter was not intended as a complete "refutation of Hume."
Humets analysis, ot cause and his theory of' belief are the

positive •complement of his rejection of the rationality ot causal
i nference.

The difficulities encountered in this positive

counter-proposal urge us to reconsider the arguments and premises
upon which Hume based his rejection of the knowability ot the
causal principle and causal inference.

CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF THE PREMISES
Chapter IV was a critique of Hume's positive doctrine
as explained in Chapter III.

The difficulties and objections

against Hume's positive theory of belief invite are-evaluation
of Hume's critical theory of causation.

In other words, since

the theory of belief is not wholly satisfactory, and since- the
t heory of belief was an alternative elected after Hume's critique
of causation, the validity of that critique must be reconsidered.
~hapter

V is largely an analysis of the Humean rejection of

causality proposed in Chapter II.
Throughout the positive exposition a number of propositions fundamental to Hume's epistemology have been noted.
~ropositions

can be tabulated here under seven headings.

tabulation is neutral as far as causality is concerned.
~erely

These
This
The list

purports to include the major assumptions of Hume's

~pistemology.l

Further analysis of subsequent paragraphs and a

second tabulation will indicate which of these assumptions bear
pn the criticism of causality.

1 At least one proposition, that concerning abstract
ideas or universals, was not mentioned before, but is included
to round out the list.

76

77
The assumptions are:
That experience can be
~.

That

an~lyzed

into simple components.

every i dea is &n exact copy of a corresponding impres-

pi on.
That what is distinguishcble is separable.
(y.
)

.

p.

Tha t verceptions are the objects of knowledge. 2
Tha t the scope of knm.rledge is limi ted to rela tions of ideas • .
That a general idea is merely a particular one plus a habit

pf associ.stion.
~.

That the principle of attraction is the basis of association.
Which, if any, of these assumptions underlie Hume's

~r itical

arguments?

The denial of the self-evidence of the

pr inciple of causality rested on Hume' s view- or the extent of
l'he assertion that the principle of cb.usali ty is

~owledge.

~n demonstrable
~s

separable.

principle:

rests on his atomism:

that what is distinguishable

Again both of these proofs rest on a third general

the contradictory of any matter of fact is not

mpossible.

Hence propositions regarding cause and effect are

pot certain.
In particular instances
~ender

of causality, two factors

causal implication unknowable:

:.

the dogma that what is
J

2

Hume slips back and forth from the language of the
to the language of the realist, and cannot there~ore be called a phenomenalist without qualification.
This
phapter attempts to show how his phenomenalist bent influenced
his rejection of causality.
~henomenalist
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lti__ tingui!:Oli<J.b l ~

e:::s en l!es.

is sP l; 2r c-_ble , c,nc. the f<....ilur e t o

This seconu fb ct or i s

i1

necEssc!rJ

~""r..e trc

coroll(c. ~y

t e re al

of the

re j e ction of th e ;:.i rinciple o:f cc:. us&li ty.
The conse quent s earch for t he origin of necess&ry
corulection tur ns on two points:

the

conclu~ion

that reason

ci:J.nnot demons tre:.: te a necessary. connection; and the ;)rinci ple
tha t ideas are copies of impre ss ions,

~nd

that reason even aided

by experience cannot produce a new idea for which there is no
antecedent impression.
These are the assumptions conducive to the rejection
of causality.

The doctrine of belief, in turn, depends on this

critical part of Hume's philosophy.

For it is precisely because

t he causal inference is non-logical and the concept of power is
non-em~irical,

that

Hume ~ seeks

another avenue to reality, an

assertion of the concrete "inferred" existent.
attaining reality is belief.

This mode of

The assumptions of the critical

part, then affect the whole of Hume's philosophy, for Hume
would not have been so concerned with expounding belief it
concrete reality could be grasped with strict rational certitude.
From the above analysis, precisely those assumptions
which lead to the rejection of causality can now be listed:
1.

The scope of knowledge is limited to relations between ideas,

the four philosophical relations enumerated.
2.

What is distinguishable is separable.

'"
u

3.

The

'.

con~radictory

or
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the law of causality is not self-

contradictory.

4.

Ideas are exact copies of corresponding impressions.

:

From this point on caution becomes the watchword.
,<

~~ile

admitting that Hume employs all of the above assumptions,

there are a number of commentators who believe that his con-

I'
;
I

clusions are independent of his chief psychological dogmas:
This may explain why 1t is sometimes thought
sufficient to make out Hume's scepticism as deriving
exclusively from his principle that a simple idea must
be the copy of a corresponding impression. Failing to
find an impression of necessary connection, he deni es
that we have any such idea. This misses not only the
actual conclusion of Hume's critical analysis of causation, but also his arguments to that conclusion from the
impotence of apagogic reasoning in the matter, as well
as the analytic efficacy of the rurther principle that
what is distinguishable is separable; in effect, the
substance or Hume's position in this regard. j
According to Church, then, the conclusion that

~fagogic

reasoning is powerless in matters of existence remains independent
of the doctrine of impressions
philosophical relations.

~nd

ideas and of the theory of

Equally independent is Humels failure

to find necessary connections among :natters of fa.ct.
Church' 5 analysis 1001:5 a Ii ttle
re h8bi li t bte Brune.

Perha ps

lt

~s

li .t~ e

an atterri pt to

pos s i bl e t o r.:: j ect cctu.:;&lity

or obj e ctive ne ce s sary connecti on Yl ithout wholly acce fi ting Hwue ' ,;
psy chol og y. HO'..;rever, t he uernc:,l cf ne ce ssb ry conne ct i on, t he

203 .

3

Ralph Church, Hume I 5

T~le ory

of the Uncie r 5t uld in g,

I'

~O
~

denial of implic8tion bet-ween C0use a.nci. effect, -rfoul d s eem to
i mply some so rt of 2 tomi sm or phenomenali sm.

Tni s is the

po si tion 'rihich the argumenta tion of thi s Ch&pteI· ,·;ill attempt to
de velo p .
Ea.ch of the a ssu:n:.; tions "W ill be wei ghed in turn.

The

sco pe of YJ1owl edge, or the exclusion of certainty from the area
of exi s tents, hinges on this:
fa ct is still possible.
di stCint from us.
Hlli~e

the contrarj of every matter of

The moon could be

~,OOO

or 200,000 niles

Our idea of the moon would relne.in the same.

admits a type of de facto certainty involved in the immediate

awaren~ss

of our perceptions.

The shadow of uncertainty encloses

us when we go beyond the data of immediate perception to independently existent and causally operative bodies and selves.
For Hume, the perception
i ndependently existing tree.

~

does not imply an

The perception tree does not imply

an original seed or shoot from which it grew.
j ust there in my consciousness.

The perception is

I cannot go beyond it.

This

view of knowledge would seem to imply a reason which cannot
cooperate with the data of sensation, and a phenomenal and
atomistic object of experience.
The second assumption is that what is distinguishable
i s separable.

Hume admits that the mind cannot attain to any

other existential act than that of perceptions.

Because the

atomic elements of experience can be analyzed in the state of
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isolated

i~dependence,

they are regarded as loose and unconnected

either with each other or with any "external" mode of existence.
Again, though his atomism cannot be said to be deduced strictly
from his phenomenali s tic outlook, nonetheless pe rceptual
phenomenalism offers fertile soil for the growth of this type of
atomism.

It is an easier matter to consider ideas and impres-

sions as isolated and independent than so to regard independent
ontological wholes in an ordered universe.
The third assumption, the incompetence of demonstrat ive reasoning in matters of fact, has been regarded by some as
independent of the psychological dogmas.

However, it is the

basis for Hume's view of the extent ot knowledge.

For, since

a Tact can always be otherwise than it is, Hume deduces from this
l ack of necessity a lack or demonstrability and or certitude.
This view of factual relationships is in turn conditioned by the
copy theory of ideas, psychological

atomism~

and phenomenalism.

Perhaps the copy theory o·r ideas is unessential.

Yet

it hovers over the whole of Hume's philosophy, and fits in very
agreeable with an atomistic analysis or experience.

If the copy

theory of ideas was not the reason for Hume1s conclusion concerni ng causality, it was certainly the reason for his investigation.
The original failure to find an impression of necessary connec-

tion prompted Hume to launch on his extensive and indirect
arguments preparatory to his conclusion concerning the impression
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of reflectrion or f elt determination.

The dictum that ever'y idea

has a .corresponding impression was the result of empiric induction and analysis.

When Hume encountered an exception to this

rule, an idea of nece s sary connection without a corres ponding
impression, he could ha ve questioned the value of his original
induction.

However, Hmne

pre ~erred

to maintain his copy theory

and undertake the indirect search for a corresponding impression.
Each of these assumptions points to \{hat is crucial
in Emue's analysis:

a thing does not imply another thing, a

cause doe s not imply an effect, nor an effect, a cause.

Hume's

limi tation of the scope of knowledge eliminates strict certitude
with regard to matters of fact because it eliminates any necessity in the area of concrete existents .

Hence, there is no

necessary dependence or necessary implication between existents.
The pr inciple of atomistic

sepcreb~lity

leads directly to the

denial of one distinct thing implying another.

The

~rinciple

of

,

the insufficiency of demonstrative reasoning in matters of fact
renders reason impotent to discover connection or necessary
implication between facts.

The copy theory of ideas, insofar as

i t supports a perceptual phenomenalism and discrete elements of
exp erience, leads to a separability and lack of connection between things.
The principle of sufficient reason, or in this
instance, implication, can be flatl :' denied by anyone.

This
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br ine s phi l os ophy to

&

sta nds till.

proc eed to shout the louder:

Disputcnt~

"Yes it is.ft

on both s i de s then

"No it isn't."

In

Hwne's cas e, if not the cause , at least the b&ckground and
psy chologic ol conditioner of thi s denial were found to be these
fa ctors:

n Carte s ian vieli of rea s on, a phenomenalistic view

of real ity, an atomistic analysis of experience supported by the
copy t he ory of ideas.

These factors dovetail and lntercomplement.

Ea ch of the f a ctors must· be probed to determine the value of the
analysis just given.

CARTESIAN VIEW OF REASON
With considerable dispatch and few words in the early
part of the Treatise 4 Hume excluded causal inference from the
sphere of strict demonstration.

The exclusion was based on a

clear and neatly compartmentalized set of definitions according
to which the relations between ideas are set up as the sole
subject matter of demonstration.
This division and consequent exclusion can be

j~stifie

only if there exists a break between intellect and sense, between
reason and experience.

All reasoning must be A priori, indepen-

dent of experience, and not necessarily applicable to the ob3ects
known through sensation.

Mathematical reasoning is here

considered the prime analogate of all reasoning.

4

A,

iii, 1 (69-7J).

Mathematical
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r ea s oning

C e l),

proce ed

regarclle5 ~

of ",-hether the ob jects of the

mind c&n be realized in experience.

Vithout concern for

es tablishing the historical accuracy of the phrase, the
"Cartesian" vie"r/ of reason is ta ken here to mean this

overem p hasi~

of mathematical rea s oning, the stress on a pure and autonomous
reason, operating in independence of experience.
Hume generalizes and caricatures this rationalist and
Ca rtesian

vie~{

of

reason~

then exposes its flimsy nature.

ously reason cannot operate in a purely

~

Obvi-

priori fashion,

penetrating to the intrinsic nature of a thing on the first
glimpse of its external make-up.

Only a self-sufficent and

independent reason could transcend the patient analysis of
accidents to decipher immediately the specific traits of the
sUbstance.

But Hume demands of reason precisely such instantan-

eous and definitive grasps of essences. 5

And human reason limps

away a miserable failure from the tests · to which Hume puts it,
tests which only a "transcendent" reason could pass.
In puncturing the rationalist appraisal of reason,
Hume tends to the opposite pole in emphasizing the primacy of
6
sense im ressions. In an important footnote, he rejects the
artific!aldichotomy between reason and experience and insists

5 E, IV,

6 E, V,

i
i

(24, 26, 28); V, i, (36).

(38n).
,
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on the

clos~

interplay of the two.

He advocates a close essocia-

tion between the imagination and the understanding.
Nonetheless, Hume never heals the rationalist rupture
between intellect and sense.

He does not explain the joint

functioning of diverse cognitive powers in man.

Bume retains a

rela ti vely pure reason in the s'pher.e of ma thema tics and the
comparison of ideas.

Apparently he nowhere explains the value

of this reason or the way in which it operates.

Hlli"1e fails to

consider what is involved in the discursive comparing activity
of reason.

There are problems involved in our apprehension of

any relation, in our apprehension of succession, quite as much
as in the apprehension of causality.
However, he did completely sepa rate the two types of
t hinking, analytic and synthetic, to employ the post-Kantian
terminology.

He attends very little to analytic thinking (and

Kant criticized Hume for what little he did say about mathematics), and he ascribes synthetic thinking

largely to the

imagination.
Imagination is used here not merely in the sense of
nfeigning."7

Imagination is employed in

a

~pecial sense by

7 Hume adverts to the fact that he employs imagination in at least two senses, T, iii, 9 (ll8n): "When I oppose
the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we
form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the
same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative reasonings."
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Hume to name the vivacity of conception, the fdculty or quality
"by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others.n8
Imagination is the faculty proper to belief.

The ascribing ot

primacy to the imagination is a necessary consequence in a

now king.

This leads Hume to say that "causes and effects

discoverable, not ~ reason, but Rz experlence."9

Reason cannot

attain actual causes without the help ot experience.
does not show that

~

But this

experience and not reason attains causes.

I t is still possible that reason cooperating with experience,
r eason utilizing the data of experience, can attain causes.
I t is possible that sense data can contain more than the senses
are capable of interpretIng, and further that it is the preoise
function of intellect to

furth~r

the interpretation, to grasp

t he "meaning," of the data.

8 ~ iv, 7 (265). Several leads to the meaning ot
i magination in Hume are found in Smith, PhilosoPhY ~ Dav1d ~,
459-463.

9

~

IV,

i

(25).
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The natural consequence of Hume's view of reason is
t ha t he is not in a favorable position to understand a conjoint
operation of intellect and sense, or intelligible operations with
exi stential bearings.

Hwne's reason does not profit by experience

or the repetition of events.

For the experience of similar

cir cumstances clarifies the precise conditions which antecede a
given event as the apparent determinants of that event.

Careful

obs ervation and induction point to the fact that the only reason
f or the constancy of a certain set of phenomena is this other
i nvariably concomitant phenomenon.
But for Hume, reason is not the faculty whose goal is
i ns ight.

There is no growth in

intelligibilitie~,

in the

dis covery of meanings, no cumulative penetration of the relations
and implications in our complex world, which is the reward of the
per severing drive of the intellect.
accumulation of experience, empirical
vic tim of custom.

Instead of profiting by the
underst~nding

becomes the

Once the cord binding the intellectual and

s ensory powers has been severed, imagination, the faculty proper
to belief, operates as a mechanical propensity.
HUME'S THEORY OF IDEAS
It is a characteristic of Hume's style to repeat key

ideas frequently throughout his work.

The unfortunate fact is

that the multitude of repetitions lebve the basic idea fundamen-

tally unanalyzed.

This is true of Hume's theory of ideas .

His

,.

I

'i
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exposition rRmains careless and confused.
The psychology of impressions 2nd idea.s stand at the
threshold of the Treatise as flume's basic analysis of experience.
It is unnecessary to go into a detailed presentation of this
familiar doctrine.

Simply put, the components of experience

are perceptions, which can be subdivided into im.pressions and
ide as, simple and complex.

The basic distinction between

I

impressions and ideas is the degree of force and liveliness
tog ether with the constLncy attending these
cla ssify as impressions.

~erceptionswhich

we

All ideas are exact copies of impres-

sions, faded out impressions in a sense, and derived from
10
'1 Iimpressions.
When we are dubious about the meaning of en idea,
Iwe inquire ITfrom W'h2.t impression is that supposed idea derived?"ll
This clipped &nalysis led Reid to launch his
~nvective:
~re adful

in their

PI' an idea?

I

"The articles of inquisi tion are 1'el-; indeed but very
conse~uences;

Is the prisoner an

im~res s ion

If an idea, from \-rha t impres s ion copied? ,,12
Although it is fashionable to pooh-po eh the

&ci~

rriticisms of heid, this remc:rk has con s iderable foundation.
!Phe inc;uisi torial thumbscrews (ire defini tely e;atJ1oyeci.10
10 T, i, 1 (1,2,4,5); i, 2 (in ; ,.,
55, 232, 231). E, II, (14, 17).

-,

T:,-e

~

CC .l..':>U

11

E, II (17).

12

ThclTlas Rei a , Incuiry Into The Hwr.c.n Mine , VI, 144.
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strict copy-theory is used to bolster the theory of belief.
With a one to one correspondence between impressions and ideas
i t is considerably easier to explain the association of impress ions and ideas, and the consequent transfusion of force and
vivacity, of belief-pungency.
there

1~as

At the point at which Hume saw

no impression of causation in the objects, there was

ano th er a It erna ti ve, t 0 ques ti on th e copy th eory

0f

°d ease 13

~

Hum2 apparently does not recant his copy theory,
t hough the analysis of experience in the early part of the
Treatise is incomplete.

Later the reader is called upon to

r ecognize objects other than impressions and ideas, objects of
knowledge and of belief, acts of comparison, propensities of the
imagination, qualities of human nature.

Of course, the modern

phenomenalist can say that all of these complex objects are
merely families of sense data.

Hume called the objects of belief

collections of perceptions • . This does not account for the unity
of the human person, the one person who knows, senses, wills,
feels.

Nor are collections or families of perceptions a satis-

factory account of the unitary beings, trees, cows, birds, which
we meet in experience.

13 The
merely say, as did
of all knowledge.
referable to sense
the problem, sense

It was this excessively analytic attitude

precise difficulty is that Hume did not
the Scholastics, that sensation is the basis
Hume insisted that all knowledge be directly
knowledge. According to Hume's handling of
must contain formally what is in intellect.
,

,
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of the CO P J'i theory which le d. Hum€:: to psycholcg ical at omism.
Th e second a sp ect of the theory of ideas presents
itself in the form of, a que s tion:

Whether the impression is

representative or not?

There are passages which define the
14
i mpression as representative
and other pas sages which clearly
15
imply that is is non-representative.
16
Hartnack
has discovered four dIstinct views of
impressions in

HQ~e:

two representative and two of a non-

repres entative standpoint.

Hume does not depart from Locke in

the representative view of impressions.
perception is the

i~nediate

The impression or

object of knowledge, though there

is a transcendent object which is the cause of the empirical
object.
Of the non-representative standpoints, one is
characterized by the supposition "that it would be a contradiction to assert the continued existence of the impression; the
other is characterized on the contrary by the view that such an
assertion would not be a contradiction, but tha t empirical
reasons can be fo~~d for believing it to be false.,,17

14

T, I, i, 2; I, iv, 2; II" i, 1; Appendix (638-

15

T,I iv, 4 (226); I, iv, 5 (244).

639).

16 Justus Hartnack, Analysis of the Problem Q(
Perception in British Empiricism, Copenhagen, 1950, 107-142.
17

Ibid., 140.
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"This last view, Hhich Hartnack regards as di:.:;tinct....,
ively Humean, in asserting that it is logically possible that a
perception can have a continued existence, equivalently stites
that a.

~: · erception

is not something perceived by a mind.

In this

view mental and material are not used to describe the content of
an impression.

A mind is a cqllection of various perceptions

just as an object or sUbstance is a bundle of perceptions.
Being perceived means that there isa relation between the two
collections of perceptions, "mind" and "external body."

Hume

edges near to the later so-called neutral monism of William
James and Bertrand Russell.
Without entering into more detail as to which view
Hume most consistently espoused, it is clear that his theory of
ideas provides no ground for believine in the existence of an
inde pendent world.

In any of the views, perceptions are the

immediate object of knowledge.

And though belief may go beyond

these immediate perception, knowledge never passes beyond the
frontier into the land of independent existents.

The exact

correspondence of impression and ideas conditioned Hume's
psychological atomism.

The representative and especially the

non-representative characteristics of the theory of ideas issued
in phenomenalism.
length.

Each of these will now be handled at greater
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..

PHENOMENALISM
No one can doubt, believes Hume, that ..,,re are directly

aware only of "perceptions."
of both

n~terial

Hwne believed in the existence

objects and perceptions

~nd

thought that per-

ceptions were the appearance of external objects.
phenomenalist in that he

argu~d

He was a

that we could not lcnow anything

but perceptions in the restricted sense of certain
unrisked by error.

l~owledge

"We may observe • • • that nothing is ever

really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions
and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by
those perceptions they occasion_nIB

We cannot rationally !mow

or infer anything but perceptions, yet we must believe that
there are material objects.

This apparent inconsistency might

urge the abandonment of the theory of ideas.
it established.

But

H~~e

considers

This is one assumption that an otherwise

acutely critical philosopher neglected to question.

Actually the

theory was in his favor, the necessary prerequisite for his
positive beliefs.
Reality in this phenomenalist context is nothing but
our name for a particular organization of vivid perceptions.
In Chapter III it was indicated that generally for Hume, to
believe is to take something to exist.

Hwne is careful to

insist that existence is not an idea or conceptual content.

18

I,

ii, 6 (67); also E, XlI, i (125; 126; 127).

But
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..

while insisting on the identity of content in belief and in
fiction,

Hlli~e

sometimes claims that a reference to existence

is no great distinguishing mark among perceptions:
To reflect on anything sim~ly, and to reflect on it as
existent, are nothing different from each other • • •
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any
idea He please to form is the idea of a being;l~nd the
idea of a being is any idea we please to form.
This &ttitude obviously breeds difficulties in distinguishing
between the existence of a thing and our thinking of that thing.
Brune confuses here two assertions:
-we think of has the form of a fact.'

2.

"1.

'Whatever

'Whatever i-/e think of

we take to be a fact. ,,,20

Existence may not be a perception

distinct from all others.

But it must be a principle of things

which, I-1hile eluding conceptualization, is attained in belief
or judgment.

But if existence is just another word for percep-

tion, non-existence must not be a word for anything.

Hume must

mean that in any instance what we attain are perceptions.

But

we can think perceptions which are merely perceptions a.nd He
do not call them "real things."

And we can think perceptions

which are at once vivid and systematically inter-connected;
these perceptions we call "real things."

19 T, ii, 6 (66-67). This section is the most
insistent statement of the phenomenal role of perceptions.
20

Passmore, Hume 1 s Intentions, 98.
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This is Hume's phenomenal 'Horld.

One may balk at

recognizing it &s the world with which ordinary people have
dealings.

Yet it is a world rich with possibilities when it

comes to the rejection of causality.

Without

~

reference to

independent existence it is quite impossible to explain why
certain of our perceptions are picked out as sensations, or
as memories, or as images, or a3 beliefs.

Perceptions are

sometimes alike and sometimes different, that is all.

Hume

arrives at belief in the independently real, not by the
inference of cause and effect as he asserted in Part iii, but
through the association of similar perceptions and the smooth
passage of the imagination over the gaps in perception.

A

certain propensity of the imagination overcomes the feeling of
uneasiness attendant upon the gaps in perception by producing
the fiction of continued existents.

Since the perception or

~
"

impression is considered continuous, one concludes that it is
independent.

Hence the belief in independent objects.

Perceptual phenomenalism affects the causality
arguments mediately through the belief in independent objects.
The character of cause and effect are attributed to independently existing things.

Since physical bodies are objects of

belief, bodies under the aspect of "cause" or "effect" will
likewise be objects of belief.
To insist that Hume's theory of ideas leads to
"
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p he n o~e n&li s m

bnd thence to the rej e ction of objective necessary

connect ion i s not to "answer H1.une."

HlL.'Ile has othe r argurnents,

dep ending as much on · the discreteness of particulars as on tne
"mentality" of perceptions.

However, · this does point up the

intrinsic dialectic of Hume's thought.

The theory of ideas

joins hands with phenomenalism a.nd the two lead to atomism.
ATOMISM
y{hatever objects are different are distinguishable,
and that whatever objects are distinguish~fle are
separable by the thought and imagination.
Wherever
actual

sep~ration

there is a difference runong experiences, an

may occur.

Any distinguishable experience may

be separated without alteration from other experiences with
which it is conjoined.

This seems to imply that any distinguish-

able element in experience is self-identical and self-contained,
if not self-sufficient.
individ ~ al

HlL.~e's

systems are combinations of

elements that appear in association.

Association

itself is somehow a distinguishable constituent and therefore
separc.bl e, external to its terms.

It seems difficult, under

the force of Hume's dictum, to see how

~erceptions

are repeatable

or that there can be terms without a relation or a relation without terms.
This is not to imply that experience begins with

21

T, i, 7 (18).
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c.. t oaic bloc.lcs to be buil t up into a normal conscious life.
Nor~al

ex p e~ience

in syntheses.

consists of impressions closely

associ ~ ted

Hurne's point is that elements can be discerned

Hithin t he syntheses, and that every element thus se,tJo.rotely
conceived can exist separately (even though in most instances
he might concede that it would be a fanciful possibility).
The factor of implic a tion, of causal connection,
could

sca~cely

survive the passage through the sieve of atomism.

A worl d of discrete particulars severs a.ny necessary connections
betl-Teen things:
that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other,
and as t J.le ideas of Cbuse and effect are evidently distinct,
'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be nonexistent this moment, and existent the next, without
conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea
of a cause from that of a beginning of eXistence, is
plainly possible for the imagination; end consequently
the actual separation of these objects is so far possible,
th2t it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is
therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning
from mere ideas; without which it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. 22
It is true that other possible worlds are intelligi

ible.

This does not at all whittle away the certitude that this

world is this.

Any matter of fact, any contingent existent,

Bight be otherwise or might even not be.

22

But there is a con-

T, i 'i i, 3 (79-80); iii, 12 (139).
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seCiuent de'" fc..cto ne ces s i ty in it s imn-,edia te presence.
ol d

h&3 it,

~dcge

while he sit s .

As the

bocr&te s sit s with metaphysical necessity

lilly actual contingent existen<t . now in being

re quires an actual cause for its actual existence.
Clearly HUIne' s di s cussion hels all the earmarks of
&

confu8i on of the logical with the real world.

Completeness

of de s criptive analysis is equated with existential selfsuffici <? nc y .

Hhen iJerceptions are tae only obj e cts of the mind,

l ogical [C n o real possibility become easily co:n.founded.

The

cri t e ria of neces s i ty and immutabili ty, applicc.ble to universal
e ssences, are transferred to the ort er
existents.

ot

~&rticular,

concrete

Since the atomic elements of experience, impressions

hlld ideas, are loose &nd

indep~ndent

of each other, they are

analyzed as similarly isolated in any lIexternal" state of
existence.

Perceptions can enter and

l eave consciousness

without anyone making too great fuss of searching for a cause.
'vv/}lat seems to be llanting here is something other than
perception, the act of judgment, which can affirm something
other than mere perceptions, namely, the act of being.
involves the intentional as pect of judgment.

This

But by emphasizing

t he intentionality involved in the intellect in judgment, it is
not hereby conceded that the concept is devoid of an intentional
Ci.spect.

KnoHledge can be considered as an ensemble of formal

determinations, which c9.re the determinations of the thing known,
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or knowledge can be considered as a relation, an oPPosition
between subj e ct and object.

The determinations of the act of

knowing are always given concretely in relation to the object.
An

for

essence is al\{ays an essence of something.
pheno~enological

It is impossible

description to prescind sincerely from

this relative aspect, the ad .aliguid or hoc aliguid, which is
characteristic of knowledge.

The intellect manifests an

intrinsic dynamic tendency toward being.

Though the intentional

aspect of cognition finds its completion in judgment, it is also
~
23
present in the first operation of the mind, apprehension.
Besides intentionality, what also seems to' be lacking
in Hume is a notion of relativum:

one thing which of its very

nature has a rapport, a regard for another, such as father-son,
husband-wife.

That two facts are adequately distinct shows only

that, as far as their intrinsi c nature s taken singly are concerned, it is not apparent that they are inseparable.

But if,

when they are considered in relat ion , one is known to entail
the other, it follows that they are i n separable and that the
thought of their separation implies a contradiction, because it
implies that a relation which is known to subsis t between them
does not subsist between them.

Thus, i f beginning to be really

23 See Joseph de Finance,
262-263, 280-287.

~

~

at Ai1£, PariS, 1945,
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en t a il s br: in.;; c,: u sec.: , thE: se ~;<, :::"cc tion ,o f t hese f;;,.ctor s
f&ct

i ~9 1y

a

G. t

are con tinuities between

in

in

contr ~ai c t i o n.

This hint!:;

' TIley ar e

Cic' e s

another vieW' of the
th~

y,orlc..~

iu whict. t,ilere

cause-ev ent and the effect-event.

not "loose," but connectec... , inte r' connecteci, &nd related

c o~pl ex

ways.

The

cf any di s criminable event In-

analysi~

volves the

desc:'i~tion

A thing

a thing may not be connected r.-ith Cincther.

&S

of other even ts relevant to it::. OCCllrrE:nCe
One

bi ll i ard bellI, or one gear, Can be consi<iered in isolation.

But

a billiard ball Cictually striking another, and a ge;;.r enmeshed
with another cannot be consi dered as unrelated with the other.
The difficulties of the preceding chapter suggested
that custom or association was not enough to explain our insistence on the necessary connection bet"l-.Teen certain
conjoin e~

objects.

~) airs

of

There is oper&ting some grasp of logical

connection, some rational selectivity, some formulation of
tenta tivE' laws.

The following chapter will attempt to present

a theory of causal implication.

I'"

First, however, a brief

evalua.tion of Hu.me' s main aim in philosoElhy is in order.
Throughout these pages of exposition and critiCism,
the questioning and inquiring
HUl:1e'S

philosophy is better

attitt1 C:e.

attit~de

~') resente d

of Hume has been evident.
as a critical or inquiring

As an exponent of systematic doctrine, Hwne leaves

much more to be desired.

But we can hardly absolve ourselves
,

j
l

"

"
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by :!' ,':-!1Ci r Lin,s t Lot his ;;hiloso ;;hy i :::. rich in problems

U1L!

hints.

llr s t, the re i s one basic factcr at the threshold of
HU;:le' s ph iloE:,ophy.
t n~ t

Hu:ne 'iuestions the I'unciCi.ment.sl l;rinciple

2ssurEnc£ ought

al~~ys

t o rest either on direct awareness

or on logicGlly cog-ent -:> vi cl. ence.
181"[.2 nW i~ b ,::; r
iil.2cD

HUIlle

y;i shes

to insi ~ t the. t a

of 11o.n's c onv i ctions C're not r8tion&1 and thct a

can and must be guided by custom or- experience more than

by rease,n.

It is the denial of the above fundamental

lJrinci~le

"-ihich renc.ers Burne's philoso>hy some·w-ha t independent of the

of the corporeal world.

His major concern was to displace the

trc:.ditionally conceded function of intellect by another avenue
to reality.

Hume

Y.~as

chiefly interested in his doctrine of

belief and in the principles of attraction or association.

The

preliminary analysis and critique of causality was devised to
indic2.te that the instrument of reason was too inadequate to
gra pple with e xistential reality.
These two contributions or interests of
indicate two major influences.
hearkens back to Newton.

H~~e

also

The principle of association

Neylton shoy,'ed that the fundamental

chEmges in the physical Horld could. be explcined by the prln-
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ciple of gravi ta tion.

And with gravi ta tion, Ne'rTton could point

to asscci c; tion as a fact of experience

".;i thout

appealing to any

occult cause.
Hume applied this doctrine to the knowing processes.
The fundamental changes in the mental world could be explained
by the association and attraction of
and ideas.

of impressions

~ erceptions,

In this way Hume develops a dynamics of the mind by

which he can give a mechanistic account of mental processes.
He finds " a kind of ATTRACTION which in the mental world will be
found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and
to shew itself in as many and as various forms. n24
From this G<.nd other passages it is clear that Bume
considered the principle of association to playa significant
role in his philosophy:

"If anything can entitle the author to

so glorious a name as that of inventor, it is the use he makes
of the principle of the association of ideas, which entefs into
most of his philosophy.n 2 5
Hume's other major concern, belief, especially under
the aspect of the dominant role that feeling plays in belief,
reflects the influence of Hutcheson.
is

~

Hume asserts that Abelie!

properly !as. act of the sensitive, .:t.hm.2.t

4

24

~ i,

25

Abstract, 32.

(12-13).

~

cogitative

lO~

This indicates Burne's
e~]ha2is

f~~d~rr.ental

on feeling or passion in place of reason.
Tne i-lork of Hutcheson 27 maintained the dominant role

of feeling and passion in moral matters and insisted on the noncognitive chLracter of the aesthetic and moral senses.

Hurne

J1imself \,Ti tes of Hutcheson in a note appt:~nded to later ed.i tions
pf the Enquiry:
But a late Philosopher Mr. Hutcheson has taught us,
by the most convincing Arguments, that :'4orality is
nothing in the abstract Nc.ture of l'hings, but is entiraly r olative to the Sentiment or mental T~ste of each
particular Being • • • Moral Perceptions, therefore,
ought not to be class'd with the Operations of th~8
Understandine, but with the Tastes or Sentiments.
Hutcheson believed thEtt moral sf-mtiments and judgments are determined for us by nature.

We are so constituted by

nature to judge of good and evil, immediately and involuntarily,
just as our taste reacts in a determined way to bitter and
sweet things.
Norman Kemp Smith suggests the following steps which
Hume may bave taken because of the

influence of Hutcheson:

26

T, iv, I (183).

27

The matter on Hutcheson has been derived largely

28

E, I (IOn).

~rom secondary sources, espeCially Smith, Philosophy of David

Rume, 23-47.

,"
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i f the fun d ~ne nt ~ l jUCgment s of morals, ~ s of a es t he t i cs
res t on f eel in g , n ot on reason; and i f in matter s of ~o ral
COn(luct Natu r e }:'2 S bf.:en thus ca r ef ul in ;J roviding us,
inde penden tly of all c E l c ul ~ tion and reflexion, with ' the s e
'Lil .'ied iate monit ors', may it not be so likewise in the
prof ess e dly t heore tic a l fi e ld?
May not our so-called
j udgment s of kn ch'l e dGe in rega rd to matte r s of i'2Ct B.nd
existen ce be r eal ly acts of b ~ lief, not of Imowledge-belief bein g a ;; a 85 ion and not a form of insi gilt, o.nd
t heref ore, li Le a ll p as~;ion s , fixed c..n d .predete rmined by
t he de facto fr ame and constitution of our human nature?29
The evi dence for this contention is suffici ently
convincing.

The positive teaching of Book I of the Treatise does

re ve r se the roles traditionally ascribe d to reason and the
pa s s ions.

Theoretical judgments d.o not express an insight into

a neces sary reletion • . These judgments rather convey a belief
wh i ch rests on feeling or s entiment.
Ne-I'I-ton and Hutcheson, then, appear as the two major
influences on Hume's positive teaching.

But there remains the

question of influence as it was traditionally handled by Reid,30
Beattie, Huxley, and T. H. Green.

These commentators contended

t hat Hume's te2ching is wholly negative and that it stands as a
classic reduction to absurdity of the principles of Locke and
Berl-'~ eley •

29 Smith, Philosophy- of David Hume, 43-44. Smith's
analysis of the influence of Hutcheson is convincing. However,
the following statement, that the reversal of the roles played
by reason and the passions is the most significant and the most
important element in Hume's philosophy, is open to dispute.
30 Thomas Reid, Inquiry Into
[Works, 102-103.

~
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~rom

\lithout entering too much into detail, it is clear

Chapter III of this thesis that Hume1sphilosophy is not

~holly

negative but that Hume had a definite positive contribu-

tion concerning belief and the principles of association which he
intended to assert.
However, something can be said for the traditional
view that Hurne carried the assumptions of Locke and Berkeley
to a logical conclusion.
~hether

Prescinding from the question of

Hume intended to use the theory of ideas for the same

purposes as his predecessors, the fact remains that he
the theory of ideas.

ret~ined

Though otherwise quite critical, Hume did

loot question this fundamental assumption.

Dispensing with the

shades of difference between Hume and his predecessors, perceptions are for him the objects of the mind , and ideas are copies
of impressions.

It has been indicated in this chapter how the

copy theory of ideas influenced Hume's phenomenalism and his
psychological atomism.

These two viewpoints were in turn the

basis for the negative criticism of causality.

Thus it may be

concluded that, consciously or unconsciously, Hume is influenced
by the Lockean tradition in the negative aspect of his philosophy.

To conclude, positively, Hume was concerned to establish his theory of belief, based on the primacy of feeling and
the principle of association.

Hutcheson and Newton are the two

chief influences behind Humets positive contributions.

l

!
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Negatively, nume aimed to attack the rationalist or intellectualist approach to causality and to the reality of the corporeal
,{orld.

In his negative approach, Hume borrows from elements in

the Lockean tradition and is therefore influenced by that
tradition.

CHAPTER VI
A POSITIVE THEORY OF CAUSALITY
The exposition of Hume's basic doctrine &nd the
accompanying criticism have been completed.

But criticism of

its nature is inevitably negative and therefore leaves a vacuum.
The purpose of this chapter is to fill the vacuum by presenting
a positive theory of causality.
However, since this chapter is of the nature of an
epilogue, the positive analysis will necessarily assume the form
of a brief summary.

The exposition may fail to satisfy at many

points for want of detail, but this method is necessary to avoid
"

the present analysis from itself developing into the proportions
of another thesis.

As the argumentation proceeds, sources will

be indicated wherein the matter is treated in greater detail.
There are at least three steps to be accounted for in
a positive approach to causality:

the origin of the notion of

cause, the validity of that notion, and finally the knowledge and
validity of the principle of causality.
A discussion of the origin of the notion of cause
calls for psychological or phenomenological analysis.
106
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occurrine in

t~ o.

concrete things are the primary experiences

frOlll ,;hic h , it 'W oul d seem, we derive the notion of causali ty.
But the imnedib te dE.ta of experience do not merely reveal to us
things changing, the coming-to-be of things, but also the
facto rs 1rihi ch bring about change.

Thus, for present purposes,

t",ro broc:.,d ty .'.:·e s of chc,n ge can 'be di s tingui shed.

There are

experiences of chE.nge in Hnich only the coming-to-be of the changing object is known immediately.
ap ~ ar ent

Examples of this are the

motion of the moon across ' the sky, the beginnings of

vegetation in the spring, the clouding uiJ of the sky.

In these

instances the agents of the change are not immediately experienced
We also find within direct experience both the
changing

~hings

and the agents of the change:

a hammer smashing

a nail into a plank, a knife cutting a slice of bread, a man
chopping down a tree with an axe.
Instances of this second type of change appear most
~ruitful

as a source of the notion of cause.

For granting the

abstract possibility of garnering the notion of cause from
l1etaphysical reflective analysis based on changes of the first
type, it seems much more probable that the notion of production
or efficiency arises in ordinary eX!lerience only from instances
Iof change in which the external agents of the change are perceived
~irectly.

Such direct experiences as pushing, pulling, being

.

/

~------------~~--~~--------~~
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bumped against, feeling a hot fire, experiencing resistance to
our efforts, willing, thinking, violent collisions and

explo~ions

-these are proposed as the material from which is derived the
notion of cause.

In the above list "internal" and "extern&l"

expe riences are lumped together.

The question

i~~edi&tely

arises

in this matter whe ther our not'ion of cause comes more ir£'1!nedi[;.tely
from internal or external experiences.

There is not space here

to pass final judgment on this debated point.
However, it appears plausible that the most direct
experience of cc.usnlity is in those instances of causation in
which the action and ~) assion involved in prediccunental caus&li ty
has as one of its terms the human person.

Such basic actions

as pushing or pulling furniture and othe r

objects, actions in

which the person experiences himself as the source of motor
activity which brings about a change in some external body or
, in some other rart of his own body, or actions in which the
person feels his body acted upon by external agents, his attempted movements blocked or resisted--these causal actions are proposed as the prime source of the notion of Cause or productive
agent.

These experiences are "external" insofar as external

bodies are involved as agents or patients.

The experiences

are "internal" insofar as the person is involved as agent or
patient.
Human experience is. clearly rich in instances of
~

________~________________~;______~__~If
"
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causal activity.

We displace certain objects by pushing them,

breCiking thEm, bending them.

Certain looks or words attract or

repel other men and animals.

These are instE.nces in which men

are conscious of their active influencing of other things.
Other things also influence men.
hurt us when they are hurled against us.
efforts, are easy or difficult to
also act on each other.
to set it in motion.

Things resist our

~anipulate.

Other things

One billiard ball collides with another

A strong wind

tornado demolishes the same building.
"'Theel.

Certain things

makes a building sway; a
Cascading water turns a

Animals are caught in traps.
These are all banal, everyday experiences.

But from

these, men get the idea of one thing acting upon, producing
another thing.
causality.

These may be called primitive experiences of

Just how primitive the experience of causality is

can be indicated by relating causality to the first kno'Yiledge
of external reality.

Upon what is based the judgment or asser-

tion of concrete reality independent of the mind?

It is

grounded in the experience of other things acting upon us
independently of us.

It is the immediate experience of being

resisted by or deter~nined by corporeal beings.

This original

experience of action and passion, in which the concrete thing
and the human person are the agent and patient, 1s the datum
upon which is based the existential judgment.
'J
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..
existence is based on an actual instance
The causal instances

~hich

of causality.

have been taken as

primary are largely mechanic&l movements.

There are also

qualitative changes, such as the sowing of a field and the
ap pearance of vegetation, the heating of water and its boiling.
Causality is present in these inst&nces, but it is not experienced

i ~~ edi a tely.

Its affirmation rests on an inference, which

presupposes the said notion of causality.
(

The qualitative even must be assimilated and integrated into a present impression of causality or
activity.

mechan~cal

There are instances of this, such as the purr of the

automobile motor when one steps on the starter, the sound of an
electric bell at the

~ressing

of the button, the production of

sound at the striking of a piano, key.

In the visual field, a

parallel would be the lighting up of a bulb at the turn of a
switch.
In all these instances the qualitative event is
as s ociated with some mechanical activity on the part of the
human agent.

In this way the qualitative event is assimilated

to the more prLni ti ve experience of mechanic&.l acti vi ty and
interaction. l

1 The priority accorded mechanical movement over
qualitative change is based on the findings of A. Michotte,
k Perception De Ita Causc:lit~, Paris, 1946, e~pecially 220-256 •
.,
I

'(

III
~uali t u ti ve

events iihich are not connect ec. -wi th

mechc.nical ac t i vi ty, such

a~

growt h or t he aP l.' ec...r , .nce of a

f ieLl of wheat 2ft e r sOHinc , demand interpreta tion and elaborat i on en the da ta of exp erience.

These are causal inst&nces in

which only the coming-to-be of the patient, and not the activity
of the aG ent, is directly experienced.
The data of "internal" experience ca n be put briefly;
There i s the spontaneous conviction of men that they are the
masters of their actions, that they have the power to produce
movements of their limbs, that they can direct the course of
t he ir thoughts.

There are al s o insights which connect the

experience of an insul t and the consequent anger, the mm-rledge
that one's grief is due to the death of a loved one.

In these

latter instances, internal experience suggests that not only
are the cause and effect within experience but that one even
.
2
attains to the reason why the cause produced the effect.

The first few pages of this chapter are deeply
indebted to Michotte's findings and his analysis of the origin
of the notion of cause.
2 A. C. Ewing, "A Defence of Causality," Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, London, XXXIII, 1932-1933, 124-125.
He writes: "It seems to me that we can see and to some extent
really understand why an insult should give rise to B.nger, why
love should lead to grief if the object of one's love die or
prove unHorthy, why a success should give seme pleasure."

L-________~____~__~~____~____________~~y

I
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Maine de Biran de s erves mention at this point.
consi der:;; t he

~ 0 ntil!lent

He

of effort, the characteristic of volun-

t ory movement, to be the primitive fact as an experience-type of
causality:
d(:m ~ un rcpport fond&mental simple, ou irrtsoluble en
".'~
'
t e Dne s pnenomenlques,
ou ~a cause et l
'efiet,
Ie sujet
e~ 1e Licde 2ctif, se tIouvent unis indi visi ble:-n.ent dan Ie
1Ie!!~e s entiment ou la merne perce l: tion d' effort (nisus)
dont l e s muscles soumis ~ 1a volonte sont les organes
iJro pres. C'est de cette impression originelle d'un
eff ort que d~rlvent toutes le s idees de force ou de
cause. 3

Certainly Maine de Biran, by his careful descril)tion
of the causal da.ta and by his insistence on the sentiment of
effort and the experience of resistance, has done much toward
the refutation of Hume.

However, since external action is

concerned with material objects, it is difficult to determine
just how far volition is able to affect material objects or the
movements of limbs.

That is why instances in which there is

physical contact and interaction between the human

~erson

and

concrete things in an action passion relationship are here
regarded as the experience-type of causality.
Having indicated the origin of the notion of cause,
the psychological account must give way to a brief metaphysical

3 Maine de Biran, Oeuvres choisies de Maine de Biran,
Edition Montaigne, Paris, 1942, 165.

,
/
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e x p lan a tio~

of what is me&nt by effici ent cause.

In all the

exam ples cited the essential character of the agent or the cause
consisted in productivity, in the maj.cing of a thing by action.
An

efficient cause is a cC.use or !'lrinci plp. which, by action,
'-.

produces the being of another.
action.

Causality is essentially, then,

It is the actuality of an active potency which is

productive of a distinct term. 4
Causclity is not just any action.

Action is ca.usal

only a.s the action of an agent ordained to a term as to an effe'c t.
As yet, it is not clear just what this productive action is.
Action is an ultimate ca.tegory and can scarcely be adequately
defined but only pointed to.

But it is to be noted that causal

action is not to be conceived as an emission, a transplantation
of entity or energy.

De Regnon states very clearly that the

action is not a reality which goes from the cause to the effect.
This intermediary reality, which is neither in the cause or the
effect, would be a reality existing in itself, that is, a substance. 5

4 This definition of causal action is taken almost
verbatim from Francis Meehan, Efficient Causality in Aristotle
and st. Thomas, Washington, D. e., 1940, 207, where he writes
that causal action is the "actuality of an active potency which
is productive of a term distinct from itself regardless of
whether this term is intrinsic or extrinsic to the agent in
ques tion. • ."
5

,

P. de Regnon, Metaphysigues

~

Causes, liv. 3,
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,

Jfficient c&usality is distinct from the relation of
causality, a f&ct which Hlllne did not advert to.
. resul t s from the action of ceus;:.li ty.

The relation

But the relo.tion remC>.ins

eV9n though the causality ceases when the action ceases.

The

relation continues because the action leaves in the cause and
in the effect a permanent deterrrQnation which is the foundation
of the relation.

Causality belongs more properly then to the

category of action than to

~lat

of relation.

,Some understanding of what causality is can be h&.d
from a view of the action-passion correlate and
of the Scholastic dictum, actio est in passo.

fro~

a grasp

Although distinct,

cause and effect are not isolated to the point that transitive
action of one upon the other becomes unthin1;:able.

Rather the

causal action is precisely that in which the two things, cause
and effect, are united and distinguished.

The union of two

things is not their fusion, much less their confusion.

The

distinction of two things does not ccnstitute them as two atoms
or two worlds.

Four things can be mentally distinguished in the

ch. 2, a. 3, Paris, 1886, 195: "LJaction n'e~t pas une r~alit~
qui sort, de la cause et qui se propage jusqu'a lleffet; car
cette realite intermediare~ qui,ne serait ni dans Ii cause ni
dans l'effet, serait urie realite existant en alle-meme, c'esta-dire une sUbstance. Qui oso. jamais soutenir une conception
aussi grossi~re?"
The metaphysical account of the notion of cause
presented here owes much to de Regfton's M~taphysigue, especially
Livre III, Chapitres II and III. Also considerable help was
derived from Meehan, EffiCient Causality, especially 170-240.
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action-passion correlate:

the beine of the cause, its acting,

the rece ption of i ts influence, 8.nd the being of the effect.
There are the Qaker and his lmife, the movements of hand and
knife, the being cut of the bread, and the cut in the bread
itself.
Thus the action of.the agent is in the patient.
which is done, the becoming, is in the effect.
place in the bread.
teacher.

That

The cutting takes

Instruction is in the student, not in the

The movement, under the aspect of the becoming of the

effect, is a passion.

~nsofar

as it is related to its source,

the agent, the same movement is an action.
fIlct of cause E.nd effect,6
of }mm{e r and known. 7

Action is the common

just as knowledge is the common act
L

The origin of the notion of cause and the exact
meaning or value to be attached to the notion have been considered.

Hurne

may still ask his question whether one thing

6 This double aspect, action and paSSion, of the 'one
movement is succinctly expressed by St. Thomas, In III Phy. 4,
p. 392 a-b: "Idem est actus moventis et moti: moventis enim
dicitur inquant~~ aliquid agit, moti autem inquantum patitur;
sed idem est quod movens agenda causat, et quod motum patiendo
recipit • • • Idem enim est quod est amovente, ut a causa
agente, et quod est in mota ut in patiente et recip1ente."

,
by Andre Marc,

7 This happy comparison is made
Dialectiaue De L'Aff1rmation, Bruxel1es, 1952, 441-442: "Reprenant un langage qui formule la 10i de 1a connaissance, acte
cornmun du connaissant et du connu, disons que A1 1 action est
l'acte commun de 1a cause et de 1leffet, Ie meme acte des deux."
I

II
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ac t ually produce s or cause s anothe r.

This is not yet a

~uestion

of t he nec ess ity existing between C2use and effect, but merely
t he que s tion of whether there a re re&l productive agents in the
. . rorld.
The simple and direct answer is contained in the
account of th e origin of the 'notion of cause.

li'or there are

instances of activity in the world in which we directly experience
both the coming-to-be of the patient and the activity of the
ag en~.

We understand that as a matter of fact, prescinding from

questions of necessity, some things do change in dependence upon
an agent.

This is an

i~ediate

primary experience of existence.

datum, a datum involved in the
lrJllen we l.::now ourselves as

eXisting, we experience ourselves as the sources of willing,
thinking, and acting.

When we judge that there is a concrete

world independent of us, we so judge precisely because this
I{orld acts upon us causally to determine us to know.
Some things, then, as a matter of fact change under
the influence of an agent.

But is this necessarily so?

This

raises the question of the validity of the principle of causality.

To phrase the question metaphysically, can a thing pass from

poWncy to act without the productive activity or some agent?
One can thus far assert that with consequent necessity
a given A is the cause of B.

One may also assert in an enumera-

tive judgment that all the instances of change in his experience
, I
I

)
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have an age nt or effici ent c[-us e accomFLnying them.

In this Wf.'y

many exp erience s of causation may generate the notion
gene ral c2u sc=.: 1 lar!.

or

a

This is close to w!: at Hwne ueant by the work

of habit and association.

But eV 9n though the plurality of

in s tcmces of cau s.stion does suggest the formulation of a general
law, yet the judgrnent of necessity that there exists a necessary
connection between cause and effect cannot result from a mere
smnmation but requires rather a reflective analysis to determine
the value of this necessary judgment.
The precise character of this reflective analysis is
to subsume all effects under the category of ccntingent or
participated being.

Then by reflecting on what it means to be a

contingent being and what it means to have a cause, one concludes
that "to have a cause" is of the

nature of a "contingent being."

To say that every contingent being demands a cause is to say that
the notion of contingent being implies the

n<..~ tion

of CEi.Use.

The

first step in establishing the principle of causality, then, is
to indicate the meaning of implication.
Implication8 is considered as holding between propositions.

This is its use in logic.

But

or indicE.te facts or classes of facts.

~ro r osltions

represent

Thus if proposition A

8 This explanation of the meaning of implication
presents in s~~ary fashion the thought elaborated in D. J. B.
Hawkins, Causality and Implics.tion, London, 1937, 47-48.
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implie s pro pO'Si tion B,
of t he

cla s~

2.n d

lJ rOposi t ion A.

of t hings A hnd

~ roposition

re~res ~ nt s

E

chb.r2cter

B indicates a chhracter

of t ile class of things , B, t h en any instance of A implies B.
Imp lic ~ tion

is as vali d a s the ide&s or propositions between

wh i ch it holds.

W'n'2n implicd tion holds betw-een factubl proposi-

tions, then it r el a tes t he facts themselves.
Two conditions for vCilid implication become c l ear.
The fir s t i s the existenc e of a ccncrete world independent of the
mental worl d of

logic~l

~ ro p o s itions.

If the

~ ro p ositions

are to

bear some relation to facts, tr.e3 e facts must exist and be
re presented in the propositions.
Secondly, implication is primc.rily an inten3ional
relation, as opposed to ex tensional or enumerative.
things are conjoined spatially cn6 temporally.

Singular

The conjunction

of abstra ct natures is by the intensional relation of irrtplication.
Thus the s e cond factor or condition for -valid implication is
abstr2ction or the ability cf the mind to gra sp the universal
aspects of things.

For implication involves the grasping of the

characters or attributes of the objects of class A and of class B.
Then, when a character or attribute of the apprehended nature A is
seen to demand some attribute of the nature B, a necessary relation is asserted to exist between A and B.

Consequently whenever

A actually exists, B must also exist, since A cannot be given
without B.

Implication is thus a togetherness of absolute

I
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n&ture s .
In an actua l ins t&nce, inpl i c&tion comes to

me~n

t his

An inst2YlCe of .A ' ;ithout B i s conc eivcble 11' only A is con-

s i der ed .

Thlt if B is al s o c onsidered, an instance of A without B

i s Lilp os s ible.

}\n 6 since I--! e are Ciec..ling here ;;ith un i.versals,

t he

is vali d for eyery instance of A and B.

i M~ lica t i o n

The

t e rms be tween which the implic &t ion obt&ins are absolute netures.
It applie s to s ingulars insofar as these embody the natures.
An im.plicative pro position, then, is one in which
on e a bs Glu t e nature is as s erte c. t o have a ccnjunctive relation
with another nature.

This mu .: : t be distinguished from a proposi-

ti on in wh ich a predic&te is affirmed to belong to a singular
subj e ct,

&5

in "This mun is white."

The implicative

~roposition

or implication expresses an if-then relation between the universa
subject and the universal predicate.
Implicative propositions may be of two kinds.

An

implication can be contained in a judgment which is merely
explicative.
are extended."

1m example of this is the propositicn, "All bodies

The predicate, extended, is asserted of the

subject, bodies, as a part of its meaning and as derived from a
simple analysis of the meaning of the subject.

"What is red is

colorec., fI and "Every rose is a flower," and "Ev.:;ry colored thing
is extended," are all examples of this tYfJe of implication which
which is expressed in an explicative judgment.
~.
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But there is also an ampliative judgment which
provides an extension of lrnowledge in such a way that the
predic &te cannot be derived from the mere analysis of the subject.
Both the terms of the implication, both the subject and the
Given both the subject

predicate, must be yresent and KnO\m.

and the predicate, the i ,redic2.te is found to be implied by the
intelligible nature of the subject.

An example of this is the

case in point, "Every event has a c&use."
i~plicaticn

In either case, whether the
by

~ere

is 6iscovered

analysis of the subject or by the conjcint analysis of

the subject end predicate, all that is required is th2t the terms
•

of the implication be fully and distinctly &pprehended.
For any Valid implication between facts two things,
it has been noted, are

re~uired,

a concrete world independent

of us and a mind capable of abstraction.

A third piece of

met&physic&l eGuipment is required when there is question of the
conjoint analysis of the two concepts, "contingeIlt being" and
TIthing having a cause."
reason.

This is the principle of sufficient

As a l_,rinciple of reality, its ta tes that everything

which is has a ground of its being, "irhether in its own na tu~e
or outside it.

It is also called the principle of Wliversal

intelligibility.
Now the questicn is this.

Must eveL'y event r..&ve a

cause, or can a thing come to be Hithout an agent?

To examine
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the matter in its metaphysical context, it is necessary to revert
to the concepts of act and potency.
The thing which become s, before it becomes, cannot
have that which it acquires.

Change is precisely a tendency or

movement toward act.

Act is the term of a l l movement and

bec oming.

cro~n

Act is the

of ,a chievement, the maturity of

rowth, because movement is the passage from the i mp erfect to the
erfect.

Act is thus logicaliy prior to potency.
Yet there is the apparent antimomy in the real order

in that, in every instance of becoming, potency chronologically
precedes act.

This antinomy is resolved in that, though potency

precedes act within this changing thing, this changing thing
emands an act outside itself which determines it to achieve the
oerfection to which it is destined.
This other, this act which determines the changeable
hing to become, is what is called efficient cause.
rinciple

Applying the

of sufficient reason, mobile being has its sufficient

easen either in itself or in another.

It does not have the

ufficient reason in itself, because then it would give itself
hat it receives.

The changing thing would already have that

hich it gives itself.

The changing thing would already be that

hich it is becoming and which it precisely shculd not be in
rder to become.
It is clearly necessary that it have the sufficient
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~'ea. son
~ould

in .s.rfother which is &lre&dy in act.

Other,dse potency

bG prior to act, non-being prier to being, end the more

Derfect would be explained by the less perfect.

Tne principle

pf contradiction violently opposes all of this.
From this analysis it is clear that it is the nature
pf a "thing which comes-to-be" ,t hat it necessarily "has an
efficient cause."

The intrinsic principles of ch2ngeBble being

Bre insufficient to explain adequately the change.
'has an efficient cause" belongs

necessar~ly

T11e predicate

to the subject

'whatever becomes."
Every effect, every being that changes, has an
~fficient

cause.

.

~rinciple.

This is not the broadest enunciation of the

Becoming or change reveals a particular characteristic

pf. all being that changes.
pr limited being.
~ot
~t

~

be.

A contingent being is one which can be or

A contingent be ing does not neces s arily exist, since

does not have the reason for i ts existence in itself.

-

Since

given contingent being is, and s ince it does not have the

~ufficient
~n

It is contingent, or partici pated,

another.

reason for its existence in itsel f, it must have i t
By comparing the netion of "contingent being" with

the notion of "that which has a cause" one finds the.t the "other'!
which contingent being implies is b.n efficient cause.

Thus the

,

principle of causality can noyr be enuncio.ted in its ,·d der scope:
W"hatever exists contingently (every partiCipated being) has an
,
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efficient cause of its existence.
To conclude by way of summary, the noticn of cause is
more probably derived from instances of change or causation in
which both the coming-to-be of the thing changed and the
activity of the agent bringing about the change are immedi&tely
experienced.

Instances in which there is physj.cal contact end

interaction between the human person and concrete things in an
action-passion relationship are regarded as the experience-type
of causality.

Internal experience is equally immediate.

Man

experiences himself as the source of willing, thinking, and
acting.

He experiences resistance to his efforts.
Secondary instances of causality are experiences of

qualitative causality which are associated with mechanical
activity, such as the striking of ·a piano key and the production
of sound.

Also secondary are

lnstance~

in which, though both the

cause and effect are experienced, the person is not involved as
agent or patient.

Finally there are all those instances of

causality in which only the effect or the change is experienced,
and which demend an inference to determine that there was a cause
and what the cause precisely is.
Metaphysical analysis of the nature supplemented the
psychological account of the origin of the notion of cause.

The

metaphysical analysis indicated that causality is essentially
action.

Causality is the actuality of an active potency which
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is product!ve of a distinct t 8rm.

The orcti on

0 l'

t ne ag€n t ·1S 1n
·

t he l:)2tient, s ince the C2.u scl action is the common act of cause
and eff ec t.
Thi s led to the question of the necessity expressed
n the principle of causality.
f ~c. u sc, 11 ty,

To establish the principle of

the following fa.ctors were involved as prerniEes:

'( !OrI el of concrete existents independent of the mind , a hwn6.n
intellect which is cc.pable cf discerning unive:rsal Cl.spects of

I these

conc rete existents, the principle of sufficient reason end

I,

~he

I

existents.

fact of implication as obtaining between these concrete

With surprising exactness these factors correspond,
by way of opposition, to the ' 1-remises involved in Hume ' .s denial
of

causallty~

In the conclusion to the body of the thesis

expressed at the end of the last chapter,
ciencies were considered to' be:

Hurne's major defi-

a phenomenalistic view of the

object of knowledge, an inaccurate account ot the proper work of
human reason, and an atomistic analysis of experience.
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